In all fairness, George W. Bush was never cut out to be president. But for the accident of his birth, this modestly gifted man would have spent his life in relative obscurity – a good neighbor, pillar of his community and church, and all-around good guy. Living the ordinary life for which Nature fitted him, he would likely have been happier.
Assuredly, his country would have been.
Instead, Mr. Bush – president by virtue of his last name, a bit of Oval Office hanky-panky, and the decision of a divided Supreme Court – is now challenging James Buchanan for last place in the historical rankings of America’s presidents.
Personally, I doubt he’ll make it. Buchanan, after all, lost seven states – not in the electoral college – from the Union. Had it not been for the extraordinary leadership of his successor, Buchanan might have gone down in history as the last President of the United States. In terms of character, at least, the decisive Mr. Bush stands head and shoulders above the dithering Buchanan.
Unfortunately, given his disinclination for personal study or deep reflection, Mr. Bush’s decisiveness has often proved a weakness. He has relied too readily on the advice of others of his class – well-heeled men in tailored suits who speak in the ultra- macho, football-and-combat vernacular popular among those who earn millions without ever getting their well-manicured hands dirty.
As a result, Mr. Bush has decisively put himself on the wrong side of many issues – environmental, scientific, economic, and social. For these errors, History might well forgive him. But he has also led his country into an absolute quagmire in Mesopotamia – overextending our military to the breaking point, alienating our allies, and bankrupting our treasury.
For this one mistake, many times compounded, History will almost certainly judge him harshly.
In his decision to commit 21,500 additional troops to the mess in Mesopotamia, President Bush has disregarded the judgment of his fellow citizens, clearly registered in the mid-term elections. He has flown in the face of informed military opinion, as reflected in the outspoken opposition of retired generals who had heretofore supported him. He has lost the near-unanimous support of Republicans on Capitol Hill.
Today, Mr. Bush is approaching the nadir Mr. Clinton reached after he lied to the nation about his relations with Miss Lewinsky. A weakened President, having lost his majorities in both houses of Congress, enters the last two years of his presidency with dismal approval ratings and his party on the verge of mutiny.
Eight years ago, I was among the handful of Democrats who publicly urged Mr. Clinton’s resignation. My reasons had something to do with his infidelity, more to do with his mendacity, and much to do with his forfeiture of that priceless presidential asset – credibility.
But my main reason was that I was more interested in the issues Mr. Clinton championed – and the party he led – than in the man himself. Mr. Clinton had become a liability. If he resigned, President Gore could have used the next two years to regain the policy initiative – and to enter the 2000 presidential campaign as a prohibitive favorite for election in his own right.
Looking back over the past six years, it’s painful to think where America might be today had President Gore won re-election in 2000 – as he certainly would have.
We would, of course, have troops in Afghanistan. More troops, including the special ops teams which were diverted from chasing Osama to overthrowing Saddam.
We’d probably not be in Iraq, though we might have peacekeeping forces in Darfur.
We’d probably still be operating at or near a balanced budget, instead of running record deficits fueled by upper-class tax cuts. We’d likely be moving toward energy independence, and leading the world in combating global climate change. And New Orleans would probably be a lot closer to realizing its renaissance.
But that’s my fantasy. Mr. Clinton decided to cling to office – and history took a different course.
Today, I’d like to present a Republican fantasy – one that will almost certainly not happen – but which could happen, if Republican leaders consulted their own self-interest.
Suppose those leaders compelled Mr. Bush to face the fact that he has led his country into a mess from which he lacks the judgment, imagination, and political clout to extract it.
Suppose they persuaded him to act with extraordinary patriotism and self-sacrifice – to rescue Iraq from civil war, his country from quagmire, and his party from near-certain defeat in 2008.
Suppose Mr. Bush demanded Dick Cheney’s resignation and nominated Colin Powell to replace him – and then, upon Powell’s confirmation, followed Richard Nixon’s example by resigning the presidency.
Can anyone doubt that President Powell, soldier and diplomat, would be uniquely equipped to tackle the complex military and diplomatic challenges of Iraq?
Can anyone doubt that President Powell, with two years of incumbency under his belt, would handily defeat any Democratic challenger in 2008?
Can anyone doubt that, as America’s first black President – and a Republican – Mr. Powell would preside over a party realignment that would dwarf the fantasies of Karl Rove, making the Republicans a majority for at least for the next few decades?
It won’t happen, of course. Mr. Bush, like Mr. Clinton before him, will lead his party over a cliff in 2008.
Because no Republican will tell him it’s time to go, the future will be left to The Decider.
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Thursday, January 11, 2007
Why Presidents Can’t Quit, Part Two
Last week, I explored the curious historical fact that American presidents never resign from office – even in circumstances which would be regarded as completely untenable in a parliamentary democracy. With the exception of Richard Nixon, who resigned only to avoid the inevitable shame of impeachment and removal, no president – even under conditions of disability or disgrace – has chosen to leave office before the end of his term.
This historical anomaly has much to do with the weakness of American political parties vis-a-vis incumbent presidents. Another explanation lies in the absence of historical precedents. Simply stated, Americans – with their characteristic ignorance of how other democracies govern themselves – simply can’t imagine resignation as a viable option, because it doesn’t appear in their own history.
Today, as an intellectual exercise, I’d like to imagine that – over the course of American history – two or three presidents had been compelled to step down by the leaders of their parties. Imagine, for example, that congressional Democrats had insisted that Woodrow Wilson do the right thing after a series of strokes disabled him. Or that Warren G. Harding – instead of dying with suspicious convenience on the eve of scandal – had been forced to resign in favor of the upright Calvin Coolidge.
Would these hypothetical events, combined with Nixon’s resignation, have created sufficient precedent for Americans to consider resignation as a viable part of our political heritage? And, if so, might we have witnessed other historic resignations in our own times?
I was not a writer when George H. W. Bush announced for re-election in 1992, so I cannot prove what follows. But I recall, during several Charlottesville bull sessions, strongly advocating that President Bush resign before the end of his first term – not in disgrace, but to win greater glory.
My argument ran as follows.
President Bush stood at the pinnacle of national and international esteem. He had deftly managed America’s response to the implosion of the Soviet Union and its aftermath. He had, for the first time since the Korean War, rallied the United Nations to repel an act of military aggression by force, thus restoring the independence of Kuwait.
That said, Mr. Bush appeared to have no second-term agenda. He was running for re-election, it seemed, not because he had “fire in the belly”, but because he liked being President. Without passion or agenda, he seemed likely to lose to whomever the Democrats nominated.
But what if the President indicated a willingness to resign a year early in order to be named the first American Secretary-General of the United Nations? He would, by that single, dramatic act, add immeasurably to the prestige and power of the UN – while securing his place in history as the man gave up the world’s greatest job in order to make the UN a viable force for peace and justice in the world.
He would also permit the Republican Party to choose a candidate up to the challenge eventually provided by Bill Clinton.
It is, of course, inconceivable that President Bush would have followed this course. That is precisely my point. It shouldn’t have been inconceivable.
In 1998, after the Lewinsky affair had derailed the Clinton presidency, I joined a handful of other Democrats who called for the President to resign – not because of his sexual peccadilloes, but because his subsequent lies had destroyed the most indispensable of presidential assets – his credibility.
Understand, please, that I’d always liked President Clinton. I still do. But I believed he had forfeited any chance of achieving further policy successes. I also believed the Democratic Party would fare far better in 2000 if a President Gore entered the campaign with two years of incumbency to his credit – and considerable distance between himself and the Clinton scandals.
Today, looking back on the disaster of the Bush presidency, I regard Clinton’s failure to resign as one of the most consequential decisions in American history.
Had Clinton resigned, we would – in all probability – be in the ninth year of the Gore administration. American troops would certainly be in Afghanistan. They would almost certainly not be in Iraq, though we might now be doing something about Darfur.
America would be leading the world in seeking alternate energy sources and combating global warming. The Supreme Court would probably remain balanced between its left and right wings. And New Orleans, I sincerely believe, would be far closer to a brilliant renaissance.
In historical hindsight, Democrats, liberals – and all those who have lost loved ones in the Mesopotamian quagmire – have much to regret in Mr. Clinton’s decision to cling to office.
It isn’t hard to imagine Republicans, a decade hence, feeling much the same about their inability to compel the resignation of the disastrous George W. Bush in time to salvage their prospects in 2008.
This historical anomaly has much to do with the weakness of American political parties vis-a-vis incumbent presidents. Another explanation lies in the absence of historical precedents. Simply stated, Americans – with their characteristic ignorance of how other democracies govern themselves – simply can’t imagine resignation as a viable option, because it doesn’t appear in their own history.
Today, as an intellectual exercise, I’d like to imagine that – over the course of American history – two or three presidents had been compelled to step down by the leaders of their parties. Imagine, for example, that congressional Democrats had insisted that Woodrow Wilson do the right thing after a series of strokes disabled him. Or that Warren G. Harding – instead of dying with suspicious convenience on the eve of scandal – had been forced to resign in favor of the upright Calvin Coolidge.
Would these hypothetical events, combined with Nixon’s resignation, have created sufficient precedent for Americans to consider resignation as a viable part of our political heritage? And, if so, might we have witnessed other historic resignations in our own times?
I was not a writer when George H. W. Bush announced for re-election in 1992, so I cannot prove what follows. But I recall, during several Charlottesville bull sessions, strongly advocating that President Bush resign before the end of his first term – not in disgrace, but to win greater glory.
My argument ran as follows.
President Bush stood at the pinnacle of national and international esteem. He had deftly managed America’s response to the implosion of the Soviet Union and its aftermath. He had, for the first time since the Korean War, rallied the United Nations to repel an act of military aggression by force, thus restoring the independence of Kuwait.
That said, Mr. Bush appeared to have no second-term agenda. He was running for re-election, it seemed, not because he had “fire in the belly”, but because he liked being President. Without passion or agenda, he seemed likely to lose to whomever the Democrats nominated.
But what if the President indicated a willingness to resign a year early in order to be named the first American Secretary-General of the United Nations? He would, by that single, dramatic act, add immeasurably to the prestige and power of the UN – while securing his place in history as the man gave up the world’s greatest job in order to make the UN a viable force for peace and justice in the world.
He would also permit the Republican Party to choose a candidate up to the challenge eventually provided by Bill Clinton.
It is, of course, inconceivable that President Bush would have followed this course. That is precisely my point. It shouldn’t have been inconceivable.
In 1998, after the Lewinsky affair had derailed the Clinton presidency, I joined a handful of other Democrats who called for the President to resign – not because of his sexual peccadilloes, but because his subsequent lies had destroyed the most indispensable of presidential assets – his credibility.
Understand, please, that I’d always liked President Clinton. I still do. But I believed he had forfeited any chance of achieving further policy successes. I also believed the Democratic Party would fare far better in 2000 if a President Gore entered the campaign with two years of incumbency to his credit – and considerable distance between himself and the Clinton scandals.
Today, looking back on the disaster of the Bush presidency, I regard Clinton’s failure to resign as one of the most consequential decisions in American history.
Had Clinton resigned, we would – in all probability – be in the ninth year of the Gore administration. American troops would certainly be in Afghanistan. They would almost certainly not be in Iraq, though we might now be doing something about Darfur.
America would be leading the world in seeking alternate energy sources and combating global warming. The Supreme Court would probably remain balanced between its left and right wings. And New Orleans, I sincerely believe, would be far closer to a brilliant renaissance.
In historical hindsight, Democrats, liberals – and all those who have lost loved ones in the Mesopotamian quagmire – have much to regret in Mr. Clinton’s decision to cling to office.
It isn’t hard to imagine Republicans, a decade hence, feeling much the same about their inability to compel the resignation of the disastrous George W. Bush in time to salvage their prospects in 2008.
Tuesday, January 2, 2007
Why Presidents Can’t Quit, Part One
The death of Gerald Ford has become – as befits our late President – a welcome opportunity for the American people to reflect upon our recent history.
In contrast with the funeral for Ronald Reagan – which was transformed by Hollywood grandiosity, a full-court press by an administration and Congress eager to claim his mantle, and the obsequious timidity of our media into something resembling the deification of a deceased Roman emperor – President Ford’s passing has offered that most useful of occasions, a teachable moment.
To be sure, there has been great emphasis on the positive, which is only natural and proper when burying an honorable man. There has also been a good deal of popular sentimentality about a bygone era which – but for the fact that we Boomers were much younger and slimmer then – hardly merits much nostalgia. But there has also been refreshing candor and some genuine effort at honest appraisal – an attempt to anticipate the long view of history in assessing Mr. Ford’s 2 ½ years in the White House.
Over the past week, I have begun to realize that we may gain a relatively balanced assessment of Mr. Ford’s presidency in our own time – something which will almost certainly not happen with respect to presidents with so many idolators as John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, or so many detractors as Richard Nixon.
Fascinating as I find these proto-historical appraisals of the Ford presidency, though, what keeps intruding into my thoughts is the simple fact that Mr. Ford came to office through the only presidential resignation in our history.
The only one.
And I find myself thinking what a fine thing it would have been had other recent presidents taken advantage of Mr. Nixon’s precedent.
If you think you know where this is going, you’re partly right – but I have a larger point in mind than the fate of the current administration. Especially since the dawn of the 20th century, a number of American presidents have overstayed their welcomes – to the detriment of their historical reputations, our national interests, and their own political parties.
As a student of both American and English history, I have often reflected upon the disadvantages of the American presidency in comparison with the office of Prime Minister. First among these, in my estimation, is the fact that – by the logic of our Constitution – ex-presidents almost never make political comebacks.
To be sure, John Quincy Adams served with distinction in the House of Representatives after losing the presidency to Andrew Jackson. Martin van Buren and Millard Fillmore ran for president as candidates of third parties. And the redoubtable Theodore Roosevelt – having voluntarily left office after two terms – actually came in second as the Bull Moose candidate for president in 1912.
But, with the single exception of Grover Cleveland, no former president has ever regained the White House – a fact which perhaps accounts for the extreme reluctance of presidents to surrender office one hour before they constitutionally must.
Once in office, almost every president – including President Ford – has sought re-election. Once re-elected, every second-term president has clung to power – even Mr. Nixon, who resigned only when his removal became certain.
Even presidents whose administrations have sunk irredeemably into failure, irrelevance, or – in the case of Woodrow Wilson – literal impotence, seem to find resignation unthinkable.
Under parliamentary constitutions, by way of contrast, prime ministers are far less apt to cling to office past the point of absurdity. Assuming that human nature is everywhere much the same, the relative intransigence of American presidents cannot be attributed to some greater degree of arrogance or addiction to power.
Institutional factors cause Presidents to cling to office. The American presidency is, in many ways, an extraordinary office – vested with incredible domestic and international power – but it is also a pinnacle achieved only once. Especially since the enactment of the 22nd Amendment – which forever ends the future prospects of any president elected to a second full term – there seems little incentive for a president to leave office before his time.
In addition to the office itself, however, there is another factor which makes it nearly impossible to persuade a sitting president to step down – the relative weakness of the Republican or Democratic party vis-a-vis an incumbent president who is, among other things, its de facto head.
This has led to a great curiosity in American politics – the fact that a party’s fortunes can suffer more from the re-election of its incumbent president than from his defeat by their rivals. Parties, of course, are institutionally incapable of taking this view, but it is nonetheless worth exploring – if only for the edification of those considering starting a third party which might someday replace one of the two parties presently sharing power in this country.
I will explore these ideas further in a subsequent post.
In contrast with the funeral for Ronald Reagan – which was transformed by Hollywood grandiosity, a full-court press by an administration and Congress eager to claim his mantle, and the obsequious timidity of our media into something resembling the deification of a deceased Roman emperor – President Ford’s passing has offered that most useful of occasions, a teachable moment.
To be sure, there has been great emphasis on the positive, which is only natural and proper when burying an honorable man. There has also been a good deal of popular sentimentality about a bygone era which – but for the fact that we Boomers were much younger and slimmer then – hardly merits much nostalgia. But there has also been refreshing candor and some genuine effort at honest appraisal – an attempt to anticipate the long view of history in assessing Mr. Ford’s 2 ½ years in the White House.
Over the past week, I have begun to realize that we may gain a relatively balanced assessment of Mr. Ford’s presidency in our own time – something which will almost certainly not happen with respect to presidents with so many idolators as John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, or so many detractors as Richard Nixon.
Fascinating as I find these proto-historical appraisals of the Ford presidency, though, what keeps intruding into my thoughts is the simple fact that Mr. Ford came to office through the only presidential resignation in our history.
The only one.
And I find myself thinking what a fine thing it would have been had other recent presidents taken advantage of Mr. Nixon’s precedent.
If you think you know where this is going, you’re partly right – but I have a larger point in mind than the fate of the current administration. Especially since the dawn of the 20th century, a number of American presidents have overstayed their welcomes – to the detriment of their historical reputations, our national interests, and their own political parties.
As a student of both American and English history, I have often reflected upon the disadvantages of the American presidency in comparison with the office of Prime Minister. First among these, in my estimation, is the fact that – by the logic of our Constitution – ex-presidents almost never make political comebacks.
To be sure, John Quincy Adams served with distinction in the House of Representatives after losing the presidency to Andrew Jackson. Martin van Buren and Millard Fillmore ran for president as candidates of third parties. And the redoubtable Theodore Roosevelt – having voluntarily left office after two terms – actually came in second as the Bull Moose candidate for president in 1912.
But, with the single exception of Grover Cleveland, no former president has ever regained the White House – a fact which perhaps accounts for the extreme reluctance of presidents to surrender office one hour before they constitutionally must.
Once in office, almost every president – including President Ford – has sought re-election. Once re-elected, every second-term president has clung to power – even Mr. Nixon, who resigned only when his removal became certain.
Even presidents whose administrations have sunk irredeemably into failure, irrelevance, or – in the case of Woodrow Wilson – literal impotence, seem to find resignation unthinkable.
Under parliamentary constitutions, by way of contrast, prime ministers are far less apt to cling to office past the point of absurdity. Assuming that human nature is everywhere much the same, the relative intransigence of American presidents cannot be attributed to some greater degree of arrogance or addiction to power.
Institutional factors cause Presidents to cling to office. The American presidency is, in many ways, an extraordinary office – vested with incredible domestic and international power – but it is also a pinnacle achieved only once. Especially since the enactment of the 22nd Amendment – which forever ends the future prospects of any president elected to a second full term – there seems little incentive for a president to leave office before his time.
In addition to the office itself, however, there is another factor which makes it nearly impossible to persuade a sitting president to step down – the relative weakness of the Republican or Democratic party vis-a-vis an incumbent president who is, among other things, its de facto head.
This has led to a great curiosity in American politics – the fact that a party’s fortunes can suffer more from the re-election of its incumbent president than from his defeat by their rivals. Parties, of course, are institutionally incapable of taking this view, but it is nonetheless worth exploring – if only for the edification of those considering starting a third party which might someday replace one of the two parties presently sharing power in this country.
I will explore these ideas further in a subsequent post.
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
The Slow Death of the Democratic Party, Part Two
In my previous posting, I suggested that the Democratic Party appears to be traveling down a path to destruction first blazed by the 19th century Whigs. Today, I’d like to bring those musings into the present day.
First, a partial disclaimer. Historical parallels are a tricky business. Heraclitus rightly observed that “you cannot step twice into the same river”, for history never precisely repeats itself.
But there are patterns. In many ways, history is the unfolding story of human nature writ large – and human nature changes, if at all, at evolutionary speed. Which is why we can still suffer with Job, feel fear and pity watching Greek tragedy, and delight in good productions of Shakespeare.
It is also why nearly every great leader – from every era – has been a student of history.
Because history instructs us, I devoted my last posting to a consideration of the demise of the Whig Party in the 1850's. To summarize, I suggested three major themes:
First, that American political parties – like many human institutions – are permanently defined by the circumstances of their creation. However they may evolve over time, they can never escape the organizational DNA which went into their original organizations.
Second, that political parties begin to die when they begin defining themselves in terms of another party or parties. Stated another way, a party which loses the ability to define a vision of the future – in its own terms – is in grave peril.
Third, that, because America’s two-party system is largely self-perpetuating, a political party can survive for a long time despite dysfunctional organizational DNA and the loss of vision – but that it will eventually shatter when confronted by a great emerging issue it cannot address.
My purpose here is to suggest that the Democratic Party’s organizational DNA is ill-suited to the 21st century – or indeed, to the world of the late 20th century; that, in response to the Reagan Revolution, the Democrats have lost – perhaps irretrievably – their ability to define a vision for America’s future; and that, given those weaknesses, the Democrats now face a cluster of related issues which they may well prove unable to negotiate.
Beginning with the Democratic DNA, one critical weakness in the party has been, from its inception, an excessive reliance upon Presidential leadership. And this makes sense, given that the party was founded in direct reaction against the alleged “corrupt bargain” which denied Andrew Jackson the presidency in 1824. Party organization developed around the national convention, which focused the attention of party leaders on the business of nominating a presidential candidate. Jackson, the party’s founder and first President, was an extreme exponent of executive power – to a degree unprecedented at the time, and not to be seen again in peacetime until the late 20th century.
Throughout its history, the Democratic Party has measured its achievements in terms of its great and near-great Presidents. Unlike the Republicans, the Democratic Party can celebrate no period during which it achieved significant progress primarily under Congressional leadership.
Not surprisingly, then, Democrats have less to show for their periods of legislative control except when the White House was simultaneously held by a strong Democratic president. To a far greater degree than their Republican colleagues, Democratic Senators tend to neglect the possibilities of legislative achievement in order to pursue their own presidential ambitions – a fact which, ironically, makes it difficult for any Democratic president to cooperate effectively with a Senate thronging with his potential successors.
Even today, the newly elected Democratic Congressional majority – swept to power on a wave of public revulsion over the chaos in Mesopotamia – has no plan for ending the war. Indeed, despite the undeniable fact that the war authorized in 2002 – a war against the Saddamist regime – has been over for three years, the incoming Congressional leadership has dismissed out of hand the option of ending American involvement by cutting off funds.
It is, of course, utterly impossible to imagine Newt Gingrich, Tom DeLay, or Bob Dole adopting such a posture of unilateral disarmament. The leadership of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid has started by tying its own hands – a dark omen for the next two years.
The Democrats’ presidential obsession has meant that – to an unhealthy degree – the Party has permitted itself to be redefined every four years by whichever candidate secures its nomination. It has also gradually led the party from a pattern of glorifying past heroes (FDR, Truman, JFK, etc.) to a perpetual search for the next great savior-leader who will rescue the party from obscurity.
The present “rock star” status of Barack Obama – a man of undoubted ability but precious little governmental experience or achievement – is only the latest instance of the Democrats’ chronic desperation.
The second weakness in the Democratic DNA is, simply, that the Party has always been more a coalition than a movement. Arising, as it did, during a period of pronounced sectionalism, the Democratic Party necessarily played down internal differences while focusing upon the personality of Andrew Jackson.
This fact has never really changed. Today’s Democratic Party can most readily be defined by listing its major component groups: labor, particularly the teacher’s unions; African-Americans; feminists and pro-choicers; anti-war voters; senior citizens; and trial lawyers.
The fact that most of these groups are declining as a percentage of the American population is disturbing enough. The fact that each group wields an effective veto over new policy initiatives has – in recent administrations – entirely thwarted the efforts of Democratic presidents to fulfill the dynamic role assigned to them by their party.
In addition to its increasingly dysfunctional DNA, the Democratic Party has, since the Reagan Era, shifted almost entirely into a negative mindset. Anyone who has spent time among Democrats will know that party activists focus far too much of their energy on denunciations of their partisan foes – often in the most intemperate language – and far too little on developing workable policy proposals.
Since Jackson’s day, Democrats have been great haters, but historically, they have also been great dreamers. This is, quite simply, no longer true. JFK and LBJ were the last Democratic presidents to set forth – and follow through on – bold new undertakings. During the 1980’s, Ronald Reagan, an erstwhile New Deal Democrat, borrowed FDR’s visionary vocabulary – and the Republicans have never given it back.
Thus, even today, with new Congressional majorities and a phalanx of Presidential candidates, not one Democrat seems capable of enunciating a bold vision for a better America. George W. Bush may be the lamest of ducks, but the far-too-loyal opposition continues to allow him to set the national agenda – and the terms of debate.
All in all, then, the Democratic Party of today seems incapable performing either of the essential functions of a political party – offering an alternative vision when in opposition, or governing when in power.
Obsessed with presidential leadership, Democrats seem determined to squander their new legislative majorities while waiting for a new Moses to lead them out of the last four decades of political imbecility.
Paralyzed by the incompatible elements within their coalition, they seem entirely unable to proclaim a vision for a better America
Meanwhile, a cluster of intractable challenges – the widening gap between the secure and the insecure in America; declining educational quality for most young Americans; growing trade and Federal deficits; a global environmental crisis; America’s excessive dependence upon non-renewable energy sources; and the persistence of terror networks intent upon doing Americans harm – is coming together to form a perfect political storm.
The name of that storm is the 21st Century – or, as seems increasingly likely, the Post-American Century.
A party capable of governing – or worthy of survival – would not only offer a plan for meeting this perfect storm, but a vision of calm seas and favorable winds on the other side.
Incapable of either, the Democratic Party seems doomed to break apart in the rough seas which are now overtaking it.
First, a partial disclaimer. Historical parallels are a tricky business. Heraclitus rightly observed that “you cannot step twice into the same river”, for history never precisely repeats itself.
But there are patterns. In many ways, history is the unfolding story of human nature writ large – and human nature changes, if at all, at evolutionary speed. Which is why we can still suffer with Job, feel fear and pity watching Greek tragedy, and delight in good productions of Shakespeare.
It is also why nearly every great leader – from every era – has been a student of history.
Because history instructs us, I devoted my last posting to a consideration of the demise of the Whig Party in the 1850's. To summarize, I suggested three major themes:
First, that American political parties – like many human institutions – are permanently defined by the circumstances of their creation. However they may evolve over time, they can never escape the organizational DNA which went into their original organizations.
Second, that political parties begin to die when they begin defining themselves in terms of another party or parties. Stated another way, a party which loses the ability to define a vision of the future – in its own terms – is in grave peril.
Third, that, because America’s two-party system is largely self-perpetuating, a political party can survive for a long time despite dysfunctional organizational DNA and the loss of vision – but that it will eventually shatter when confronted by a great emerging issue it cannot address.
My purpose here is to suggest that the Democratic Party’s organizational DNA is ill-suited to the 21st century – or indeed, to the world of the late 20th century; that, in response to the Reagan Revolution, the Democrats have lost – perhaps irretrievably – their ability to define a vision for America’s future; and that, given those weaknesses, the Democrats now face a cluster of related issues which they may well prove unable to negotiate.
Beginning with the Democratic DNA, one critical weakness in the party has been, from its inception, an excessive reliance upon Presidential leadership. And this makes sense, given that the party was founded in direct reaction against the alleged “corrupt bargain” which denied Andrew Jackson the presidency in 1824. Party organization developed around the national convention, which focused the attention of party leaders on the business of nominating a presidential candidate. Jackson, the party’s founder and first President, was an extreme exponent of executive power – to a degree unprecedented at the time, and not to be seen again in peacetime until the late 20th century.
Throughout its history, the Democratic Party has measured its achievements in terms of its great and near-great Presidents. Unlike the Republicans, the Democratic Party can celebrate no period during which it achieved significant progress primarily under Congressional leadership.
Not surprisingly, then, Democrats have less to show for their periods of legislative control except when the White House was simultaneously held by a strong Democratic president. To a far greater degree than their Republican colleagues, Democratic Senators tend to neglect the possibilities of legislative achievement in order to pursue their own presidential ambitions – a fact which, ironically, makes it difficult for any Democratic president to cooperate effectively with a Senate thronging with his potential successors.
Even today, the newly elected Democratic Congressional majority – swept to power on a wave of public revulsion over the chaos in Mesopotamia – has no plan for ending the war. Indeed, despite the undeniable fact that the war authorized in 2002 – a war against the Saddamist regime – has been over for three years, the incoming Congressional leadership has dismissed out of hand the option of ending American involvement by cutting off funds.
It is, of course, utterly impossible to imagine Newt Gingrich, Tom DeLay, or Bob Dole adopting such a posture of unilateral disarmament. The leadership of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid has started by tying its own hands – a dark omen for the next two years.
The Democrats’ presidential obsession has meant that – to an unhealthy degree – the Party has permitted itself to be redefined every four years by whichever candidate secures its nomination. It has also gradually led the party from a pattern of glorifying past heroes (FDR, Truman, JFK, etc.) to a perpetual search for the next great savior-leader who will rescue the party from obscurity.
The present “rock star” status of Barack Obama – a man of undoubted ability but precious little governmental experience or achievement – is only the latest instance of the Democrats’ chronic desperation.
The second weakness in the Democratic DNA is, simply, that the Party has always been more a coalition than a movement. Arising, as it did, during a period of pronounced sectionalism, the Democratic Party necessarily played down internal differences while focusing upon the personality of Andrew Jackson.
This fact has never really changed. Today’s Democratic Party can most readily be defined by listing its major component groups: labor, particularly the teacher’s unions; African-Americans; feminists and pro-choicers; anti-war voters; senior citizens; and trial lawyers.
The fact that most of these groups are declining as a percentage of the American population is disturbing enough. The fact that each group wields an effective veto over new policy initiatives has – in recent administrations – entirely thwarted the efforts of Democratic presidents to fulfill the dynamic role assigned to them by their party.
In addition to its increasingly dysfunctional DNA, the Democratic Party has, since the Reagan Era, shifted almost entirely into a negative mindset. Anyone who has spent time among Democrats will know that party activists focus far too much of their energy on denunciations of their partisan foes – often in the most intemperate language – and far too little on developing workable policy proposals.
Since Jackson’s day, Democrats have been great haters, but historically, they have also been great dreamers. This is, quite simply, no longer true. JFK and LBJ were the last Democratic presidents to set forth – and follow through on – bold new undertakings. During the 1980’s, Ronald Reagan, an erstwhile New Deal Democrat, borrowed FDR’s visionary vocabulary – and the Republicans have never given it back.
Thus, even today, with new Congressional majorities and a phalanx of Presidential candidates, not one Democrat seems capable of enunciating a bold vision for a better America. George W. Bush may be the lamest of ducks, but the far-too-loyal opposition continues to allow him to set the national agenda – and the terms of debate.
All in all, then, the Democratic Party of today seems incapable performing either of the essential functions of a political party – offering an alternative vision when in opposition, or governing when in power.
Obsessed with presidential leadership, Democrats seem determined to squander their new legislative majorities while waiting for a new Moses to lead them out of the last four decades of political imbecility.
Paralyzed by the incompatible elements within their coalition, they seem entirely unable to proclaim a vision for a better America
Meanwhile, a cluster of intractable challenges – the widening gap between the secure and the insecure in America; declining educational quality for most young Americans; growing trade and Federal deficits; a global environmental crisis; America’s excessive dependence upon non-renewable energy sources; and the persistence of terror networks intent upon doing Americans harm – is coming together to form a perfect political storm.
The name of that storm is the 21st Century – or, as seems increasingly likely, the Post-American Century.
A party capable of governing – or worthy of survival – would not only offer a plan for meeting this perfect storm, but a vision of calm seas and favorable winds on the other side.
Incapable of either, the Democratic Party seems doomed to break apart in the rough seas which are now overtaking it.
Monday, December 4, 2006
Solving the Mess in Mesopotamia, Part One
I’m not a soldier, intelligence expert, or diplomat, and the closest I’ve been to Baghdad is Venice, Italy.
Please understand that.
If you believe – as many do – that the only proper foundation for national leadership is real-world, hands-on experience, I’m not your guy.
On the other hand, I’m a lifelong student of History, which Machiavelli – that most tough-minded of political realists – identified as the essential study of leaders.
I’m also a student (and actor) of Shakespeare, himself the greatest of all students of human nature.
If nothing else, I have those two things – History and Shakespeare – in common with Mr. Lincoln, who did a fair job of leading the nation despite a complete lack of previous executive experience or foreign travel and a military career limited to a few months as captain of volunteers in the Black Hawk War, during which his only combat was with mosquitos. (Lincoln’s witticism, not mine.)
I offer this rather lengthy disclaimer because, in Part II of this posting, I propose to set forth the course of action I would adopt Iraq if I woke up tomorrow and discovered that I was President of the United States.
For the fact is that, were I President, I would act along lines entirely at odds with anything suggested by President Bush, most of those running to replace him, the great majority of Republicans and Democrats in Congress, or the distinguished elder statesmen of the Iraq Study Group.
For all their vast and diverse experience – none of these hard-headed, real-world leaders seems to have the vaguest idea how to extract the US from Iraq without leaving behind a power vacuum which would invite intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey – and probably Israel – as well as a safe haven for Al Qaeda in Anbar province.
Which is not to say that our political leaders are incapable of devising a way forward. Success in Iraq simply isn’t their highest priority. The simple fact is that – since the midterms – few of our leaders nearly as concerned with the ultimate fate of Iraq as they are eager to catch up with public opinion.
And public opinion is, once again, headed over a cliff.
Having been duped into supporting an unnecessary and ill-considered invasion of Iraq, the American people have finally exercised the democratic equivalent of the “lemon law”. On November 7, they voted to return this lemon of a war to the folks who sold it to them.
The people want their money back.
Sadly, a war is not a used car. The harm done – to thousands of American troops; tens of thousands of Iraqis; and America’s armed forces, national debt, and credibility as a world leader – cannot be undone. The brutal regime which held together the centrifugal religious and tribal communities collectively called “Iraq” has been dismantled – replaced by a comic-opera parliamentary regime with absolutely no roots in the history and culture of Iraq.
And the fault is ours.
Mr. Bush may have led us into this war, but the great majority of Americans were credulous enough – and ignorant enough – to follow him. All but a handful of our political leaders lacked the good sense or moral fiber to try to slow him down. And those of us who knew better were too intimidated, or too fatalistic, to make much noise at the time.
We all have blood on our hands.
Nonetheless, the American people seem prepared to wash their hands of the whole business, and those who profess to speak for them are now demanding a pullout that will only compound the follies of 2002 and 2003..
But vox populi, vox whatever... If the people demand withdrawal, that’s what they’ll get, and the discussion of our options – from now on – will have more to do with affixing blame and saving face than with the future of Iraq.
Indeed, the dozens of options now under discussion seem to boil down to “cut and run” or “cut and stroll”. With the exception of Senator John McCain, no one is seriously talking about sticking around until Iraq is sufficiently pacified and well-governed to have some chance of surviving.
The Bush Administration seems to have decided on setting “benchmarks” for the Iraqi government – with the obvious intention of blaming the Iraqis when they fail to “take responsibility”. Of course, the Iraqi government has no chance of imposing order – and about the same prospects of surviving an American pullout as the former government of South Vietnam. But as long as the President can blame the Iraqis, he can bring the troops home and start planning for his presidential library.
Congressional Democrats seem content to cling to their pre-election strategy. They’re perfectly willing to place the blame on the Administration, so long as no one asks them for a constructive suggestion.
Most of the presidential wannabes – regardless of party – seem primarily concerned that America’s involvement be ended before November, 2008 – or at least January 20, 2009.
The most interesting approach is that expected from the Iraq Study Group, headed by Bush family consigliere* James Baker. The Group’s main suggestion will apparently be to begin a gradual withdrawal of combat units while inviting neighboring countries – particularly Iran and Syria – to help with the pacification of Iraq.
In realistic terms, this is nonsense. Given the hostility of both regimes to American interests, they can scarcely be expected to make things easier on us. Their interest is to reduce Iraq to a puppet state, and steps in that direction would almost certainly spark counter-intervention by the Saudis, probably the Turks – and, inevitably, the Israelis.
The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations offer an unpleasant future for Iraq – and long-term problems for the US. Indeed, these recommendations are make sense only when seen in terms of Mr. Baker’s loyalty to the Bush family – i.e., as an attempt to shift blame for Iraq’s destiny onto a pair of unpopular states – thus beginning the process of salvaging the historical “legacy” of Bush the Younger.
In short, nothing now being discussed in Washington makes sense in terms of America’s national interests. If we, the people, insist upon getting out of Iraq at any price – and allow our politicians to consult their own interests in doing so – we will be buying temporary relief at the price of future disasters which will make the present war seem like a mere unpleasantness.
Which is why, were I President, I would disregard the voices of nearly everyone in Washington and act decisively – even ruthlessly – to foster America’s national interests.
And I’d start with a change of vocabulary: I’d stop talking about Iraq, and start talking about Mesopotamia.
-30-
Note: I'd written this piece before reading Paul Krugman’s column of this date, but I give him credit for being the first I’ve seen to refer to Mr. Baker as the “Bush family consigliere”. At any rate, if I was ripping anyone off, it was Aaron Sorkin, for Leo McGarry’s line, “I’m a wartime consigliere.”
Please understand that.
If you believe – as many do – that the only proper foundation for national leadership is real-world, hands-on experience, I’m not your guy.
On the other hand, I’m a lifelong student of History, which Machiavelli – that most tough-minded of political realists – identified as the essential study of leaders.
I’m also a student (and actor) of Shakespeare, himself the greatest of all students of human nature.
If nothing else, I have those two things – History and Shakespeare – in common with Mr. Lincoln, who did a fair job of leading the nation despite a complete lack of previous executive experience or foreign travel and a military career limited to a few months as captain of volunteers in the Black Hawk War, during which his only combat was with mosquitos. (Lincoln’s witticism, not mine.)
I offer this rather lengthy disclaimer because, in Part II of this posting, I propose to set forth the course of action I would adopt Iraq if I woke up tomorrow and discovered that I was President of the United States.
For the fact is that, were I President, I would act along lines entirely at odds with anything suggested by President Bush, most of those running to replace him, the great majority of Republicans and Democrats in Congress, or the distinguished elder statesmen of the Iraq Study Group.
For all their vast and diverse experience – none of these hard-headed, real-world leaders seems to have the vaguest idea how to extract the US from Iraq without leaving behind a power vacuum which would invite intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey – and probably Israel – as well as a safe haven for Al Qaeda in Anbar province.
Which is not to say that our political leaders are incapable of devising a way forward. Success in Iraq simply isn’t their highest priority. The simple fact is that – since the midterms – few of our leaders nearly as concerned with the ultimate fate of Iraq as they are eager to catch up with public opinion.
And public opinion is, once again, headed over a cliff.
Having been duped into supporting an unnecessary and ill-considered invasion of Iraq, the American people have finally exercised the democratic equivalent of the “lemon law”. On November 7, they voted to return this lemon of a war to the folks who sold it to them.
The people want their money back.
Sadly, a war is not a used car. The harm done – to thousands of American troops; tens of thousands of Iraqis; and America’s armed forces, national debt, and credibility as a world leader – cannot be undone. The brutal regime which held together the centrifugal religious and tribal communities collectively called “Iraq” has been dismantled – replaced by a comic-opera parliamentary regime with absolutely no roots in the history and culture of Iraq.
And the fault is ours.
Mr. Bush may have led us into this war, but the great majority of Americans were credulous enough – and ignorant enough – to follow him. All but a handful of our political leaders lacked the good sense or moral fiber to try to slow him down. And those of us who knew better were too intimidated, or too fatalistic, to make much noise at the time.
We all have blood on our hands.
Nonetheless, the American people seem prepared to wash their hands of the whole business, and those who profess to speak for them are now demanding a pullout that will only compound the follies of 2002 and 2003..
But vox populi, vox whatever... If the people demand withdrawal, that’s what they’ll get, and the discussion of our options – from now on – will have more to do with affixing blame and saving face than with the future of Iraq.
Indeed, the dozens of options now under discussion seem to boil down to “cut and run” or “cut and stroll”. With the exception of Senator John McCain, no one is seriously talking about sticking around until Iraq is sufficiently pacified and well-governed to have some chance of surviving.
The Bush Administration seems to have decided on setting “benchmarks” for the Iraqi government – with the obvious intention of blaming the Iraqis when they fail to “take responsibility”. Of course, the Iraqi government has no chance of imposing order – and about the same prospects of surviving an American pullout as the former government of South Vietnam. But as long as the President can blame the Iraqis, he can bring the troops home and start planning for his presidential library.
Congressional Democrats seem content to cling to their pre-election strategy. They’re perfectly willing to place the blame on the Administration, so long as no one asks them for a constructive suggestion.
Most of the presidential wannabes – regardless of party – seem primarily concerned that America’s involvement be ended before November, 2008 – or at least January 20, 2009.
The most interesting approach is that expected from the Iraq Study Group, headed by Bush family consigliere* James Baker. The Group’s main suggestion will apparently be to begin a gradual withdrawal of combat units while inviting neighboring countries – particularly Iran and Syria – to help with the pacification of Iraq.
In realistic terms, this is nonsense. Given the hostility of both regimes to American interests, they can scarcely be expected to make things easier on us. Their interest is to reduce Iraq to a puppet state, and steps in that direction would almost certainly spark counter-intervention by the Saudis, probably the Turks – and, inevitably, the Israelis.
The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations offer an unpleasant future for Iraq – and long-term problems for the US. Indeed, these recommendations are make sense only when seen in terms of Mr. Baker’s loyalty to the Bush family – i.e., as an attempt to shift blame for Iraq’s destiny onto a pair of unpopular states – thus beginning the process of salvaging the historical “legacy” of Bush the Younger.
In short, nothing now being discussed in Washington makes sense in terms of America’s national interests. If we, the people, insist upon getting out of Iraq at any price – and allow our politicians to consult their own interests in doing so – we will be buying temporary relief at the price of future disasters which will make the present war seem like a mere unpleasantness.
Which is why, were I President, I would disregard the voices of nearly everyone in Washington and act decisively – even ruthlessly – to foster America’s national interests.
And I’d start with a change of vocabulary: I’d stop talking about Iraq, and start talking about Mesopotamia.
-30-
Note: I'd written this piece before reading Paul Krugman’s column of this date, but I give him credit for being the first I’ve seen to refer to Mr. Baker as the “Bush family consigliere”. At any rate, if I was ripping anyone off, it was Aaron Sorkin, for Leo McGarry’s line, “I’m a wartime consigliere.”
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