How McCain Can Win

John McCain may be the best-qualified candidate remaining in the presidential field, but as Obamania sweeps the campuses, the cities, and the more liberal suburbs, it's starting to seem that he faces a daunting challenge putting together the necessary 271 electoral votes.

Strategic suggestions abound, but many of them are hopelessly out-of-date in the changed context of 2008.

For example, McCain can't simply cozy up to the conservative base that elected George W. Bush, because that base has been decimated - and more than decimated - by the most incompetent Administration since James Buchanan. Even if the base were willing to be wooed, everything MCain did to please them would alienate critical moderates.

Nor can McCain negative on Obama, because - let's face it - the national media have fallen in love with the gentleman from Illinois. And because, frankly, attacking a black candidate is too easy to label as bigotry in an America still coming to terms with issues of race.

Nor can MCain counter Obama's lock on the black vote with an appeal to the Hispanic community because the Republican Party has painted itself into an absurd corner with its abuse of rational immigration reform as "amnesty".

Moreover, Senator Obama is incredibly articulate - and his calls for national unity and a new beginning can stir even the most jaded to at least temporary enthusiasm.

Let's assume, for the moment, that Obama has no serious skeletons in his closet - an uncertain assumption for any politician emerging from the Illinois Democratic machine. If that is the case, McCain's likely opponent has only one weakness - a weakness any high school debater would spot immediately.

He never deals with the costs. Obama promises a virtual cornucopia, but he never talks about who will bear the burden. His "Yes, We Can" is, upon examination, as illusory as the rising prices of last year's real estate market.

But how can McCain make this point?

Not, I think, in the manner which has proven so ineffective for Senator Clinton. Americans are not in a rational mood this year, so an appeal to rational cost-benefit analysis will scarcely move them.

What McCain must do is offer an equally inspiring agenda - but one which calls for sacrifice.

Think of it.

Suppose McCain begins by revisiting his vote against the Bush tax cuts, pointing out that his rationale was one of shared sacrifice. Suppose he reminds voters of his "tough talk" in the Michigan primary. Suppose that he goes on to throw a challenge in the teeth of Grover Norquist and the other anti-tax vermin, confessing that the Republican Party's failure of leadership has stemmed from its willingness to borrow and spend, rather than to bear the present burdens of present benefits.

Suppose McCain were to borrow a page from JFK's inaugural address and offer a program of real sacrifice.

As long as our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans must share the burden by paying - not borrowing - the costs of the war.

As long as America is addicted to foreign oil, we must use a creative tax formula - perhaps a per gallon fuel tax, with an exemption for the first 30 gallons purchased by an individual driver each month.

As long as global warming is a threat, a bold program of lifestyle-altering programs will be enacted to make America the world's leader in reducing carbon emissions.

And long as some young Americans bear the price of keeping us safe, all young Americans will be required to participate in a serious National Service program - eighteen months of active military duty, followed by time in the reserves, or thirty months of approved civilian service - to be completed before age 25.

Such a strategy would be risky, but it has three great advantages. First, it suits the personality and personal history of John McCain - a patriot and hero who bears in his flesh the scars of the personal price he has paid for his country.

Second, it would have the effect of throwing into profound contrast the cost-free utopianism behind Obama's candidacy.

Third, it would challenge the core of Obama's support - privileged, educated young people - to ante up with something more than words.

Which might, indeed, alienate America's entitled generation, of course. But then, Senator McCain has precious few votes to lose among this demographic - and many to gain among older Americans who understand that all good things come with a price.

Who Will Lead?

I'm looking for a candidate for President, and thus far, the search isn't going well.

There are a fair number of candidates - mostly Democrats - whom I could support on the basis of domestic issues. Assuming Al Gore has really ruled out another run, I'd probably sign on with John Edwards right now, except for one thing.

Mesopotamia.

In terms of America's future, there will be more important issues facing the next President. Global warming. Energy independence. Our mediocre public schools. Health coverage for all Americans.

All of these will probably have more impact on the long term well-being of the nation than the final resolution of the mess in Mesopotamia.

But none will so clearly demonstrate the character of America - and of the man or woman we choose as our next leader.

Simply stated, the way we leave Mesopotamia - and what we leave behind - will be a test of our national character.

We have a decision to make: Whether to take responsibility for the mess we have created - or attempt to fob it off on the feeble "government" of our creation while we scuttle away, leaving behind a situation more dangerous to regional stability - and our national interests - than Saddam ever was.

As things now stand, there is only one certainty. Whichever candidate is elected President in 2008, he or she will have - or profess to have - a strategy for the prompt withdrawal of American forces in Mesopotamia.

There may be candidates who oppose withdrawal, but - short of a military or political miracle - such candidates have no real chance of election. The American people have turned their backs on this war - and there is no precedent for their regaining enthusiasm for an unpopular war once they have expressed their opposition at the polls.

In other words, as things now stand, come January 20, 2009, our options in Mesopotamia will be reduced to how we choose to save face.

In the meanwhile, however, the campaign of 2008 is upon us. Out of that campaign, there may come a policy which better reflects our national honor - and serves our national interests - than mere withdrawal. In my view, the candidate who offers such an option will deserve - and very probably win - the election.

It's a risk - advocating the restoration of what our neighbors to the north call "peace, order and good government" before we leave Mesopotamia. It's far easier to play to the discontents of the majority by calling for some sort of pull-out. It's far easier to blame the Iraqis, or their government, for failing to solve the problem.

But it isn't their problem to solve. It's ours.

America's invasion of Iraq shattered the state almost beyond repair. Our subsequent failure to impose order and rebuild the infrastructure - added to our inane policy of attempting to transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy - led to civil war.

If we leave now, while laying the blame on the government of Iraq, the sequel will be one of two things: An intensification of civil war, which will eventually draw in neighboring states; or a Shi'ite-dominated Iraq dependent upon Iran for military and political guidance.

Either outcome would be disastrous for the US.

As I have written before, the obvious solution is for the US to cut the Gordian knot by partitioning the former Iraq into three states.

The key to partition is to award both Mosul and Kirkuk, with their surrounding oil fields and a decent territorial buffer, to a new Kurdistan. In return for independence and US protection, this Kurdish state would be required to observe three conditions: Hosting long-term US bases on Kurdish soil; agreeing not to encourage Kurdish separatists inside Turkey - or, without US permission, inside Syria or Iran; and committing to pay a gradually-declining percentage of Kurdish oil revenues to the new Sunni state in return for peace.

Assuming the Kurds accepted national sovereignty on these terms, the US could then sever the Sunni and Shi'ite portions of Mesopotamia - partitioning Baghdad along the Tigris River and using US force to assure an orderly exchange of populations within the divided city.

That done, US and British forces could turn the new Sunni state over to the supervision of its responsible neighbors - preferably under the overall guidance of Jordan. The new Shi'ite state would, inevitably, come under the tutelage of Iran. The border between the Sunni and Shi'a states would remain ours to patrol until arrangements could be made for a UN peace-keeping force.

The great advantage of partition lies in its expedition and relatively orderliness. Mesopotamia is already breaking apart. That is its fate. But the separation is now occurring with a maximum of lawlessness and bloodshed. The establishment of three states under US supervision would permit the peaceful exchange of populations and - equally important - the return of nearly a million refugees representing much of the educated, propertied, and professional class of the former Iraq.

Partition is the best thing for the people of Mesopotamia. It would also serve long-term US interests.

Done properly, partition would establish a new balance of power in the Middle East. The new Kurdistan would operate as a check on Turkish pretensions and as a potential US tool for influencing the good behavior of Iran and Syria - both of which contain large Kurdish enclaves adjacent to the new Kurdish state.

The new Sunni state would be small, relatively weak, and without oil. It would, however, contain a large part of the educated and professional class of the former Iraq and - aided by the temporary oil subsidy from Kurdistan - it could well transform itself into something like a modern society. Indeed, if Fareed Zakaria is correct, its very oil-lessness could prove the key to its evolving democratic institutions.

The great weakness of partition would lie in the fact that half of the former Iraq would come under Iranian tutelage. However, as I have pointed out before, an American withdrawal without partition would most likely leave Iran in control of the whole of Iraq - and leave Iraq in greater need of Iranian military and political aid in order to suppress Sunni separatism.

Without partition, Iranian influence over Iraq would, presumably, last indefinitely. With partition, Iranian influence over the Shi'ite rump would be of shorter endurance. As soon as the Shi'ite state regained stability and began producing considerable oil, the differences between the new, Arab state and its overweening Persian neighbor would begin to become apparent.

To me, all this seems obvious. Partition is the only responsible course - given that Americans will no longer support a long-term commitment of military force to carry out the President's impossible mission.

Yet to date, no Presidential candidate has stepped up to the plate. Instead, we continue to hear variations on two themes: "Stay the course - with more troops"; and "Blame the Iraqis - and withdraw".

The former course does no justice to our national intelligence. The latter, no credit to our national character.

And neither does much credit to the ever-growing number of politicians who think themselves worthy of the office of President of the United States.