Solving the Mess in Mesopotamia, Part Two.

In my previous post, I focused on the political situation in the US, which, in my judgment, renders improbable an acceptable resolution of the mess in Mesopotamia.

Nonetheless, I promised to set forth what I would do, if I were President. It’s easy to deplore the present lowering of expectations for Iraq’s future and wash our hands of the business – yet that tendency, in itself, merely offers our political leaders an excuse for their failure to think creatively and act boldly.

Bad as the situation is, there are things the US can do to make the best of a bad situation. But to act, we must first assess the situation.

Here’s how I see it:

First, there is no longer any such thing as Iraq. The US has irrevocably destroyed the state Saddam ruled with such malign, but effective, ruthlessness. Like Yugoslavia after Tito, Iraq has come permanently undone. Through a brutal process of sectarian cleansing and forced migration, three small nations are emerging from this wreckage – corresponding roughly, but not precisely, to the historic Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. It is, thus, more useful to speak of “Mesopotamia” than of the late, departed state of Iraq.

Second, the present situation in Iraq is not a civil war, but what has been called a “Hobbesian war” – a war of all against all. A straightforward civil war between two well-governed sections – like the war of 1861-1865 – would be vastly preferable to the present situation.

These two propositions I regard as indisputable. For the rest, I would act on the basis of six assumptions, as follow:

· Whatever they want, most Mesopotamian Shi’ites would accept control of substantial oil resources and freedom from their lingering dread of a Saddamist revival.

· Whatever they want, most Mesopotamian Sunnis would accept a reasonable share of oil revenues and freedom from the fear of oppression by an Islamist Shi’ite state.

· The Kurds would be delighted with independence, protection against Turkish intervention, and control of Kirkuk and Mosul. Given these things, the Kurds would become a key, relatively democratic US ally.

· Most of the violence in Mesopotamia results either from mutual sectarian fears or resentment of US actions which appear – to each sect – to favor the other.

· America’s only long-term enemies in Mesopotamia are a small Al Qaeda operation (based in the Sunni Triangle) and operatives loyal to Iran and Syria. Once American forces are withdrawn, most interests in Mesopotamia would be prepared to deal with us on a basis of rational self-interest.

· With American public opinion turning rapidly toward an immediate pullout, any constructive action must be taken quickly, or not at all.

Obviously, all of my assumptions are debatable, but debating them is not my purpose here. Instead, I propose to use them in constructing a plan for extricating the US from Mesopotamia without leaving behind a vacuum which will breed endless future trouble for its neighbors – and for us.

This plan would begin with the partition of Mesopotamia into three new states. The US, preferably with British cooperation, would act unilaterally to create a fait accompli on the ground. While the government of Kurdistan should be consulted, it would be pointless to attempt negotiations with the failed Iraqi government or the various sectarian and tribal interests. Population and border adjustments might come in future years, through diplomacy or war, but that is not our concern. Our purpose now should be to create three stable states capable of sustaining themselves during a period of transition and with a reasonable chance of surviving into the future.

The borders of the new Kurdistan should include the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, their adjacent oil fields, and a defensible buffer zone beyond. US forces should be deployed to secure this border and deter invention by Turkey, Iran, or Syria.

In return for the acquisition of disputed territory and resources, the Kurds should agree to pay a substantial, gradually declining, portion of their oil revenues to a stable Sunni state, so long as it maintains peaceful relations with Kurdistan. In return for a US guarantee of sovereignty, the Kurds should be placed on notice that the US reserves the right to withdraw its protection should they sponsor Kurdish separatism in Turkey – or, without our blessing, in Iran or Syria.

The borders of the Sunni state should include majority Sunni areas, including West Baghdad – but excluding the volatile Anbar province. US troops – joined or succeeded, if it can be arranged – by troops from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other friendly Muslim states – should occupy Anbar in force for a period of five years in order to round up Al Qaeda cells and give the Sunni state time to establish itself. Thereafter, if pacified, Anbar could be permitted to join the Sunni state.

The Shi’ite state would include the remainder of Mesopotamia, excluding East Baghdad. East Baghdad – the political base of Muktada al Sadr – would, like Anbar, be heavily occupied by US troops while the new state got on its feet under other leadership. In this case, US occupation would end as soon as the Shi’ite state was prepared to assume control.

Finally, while the US should negotiate for long-term bases in Kurdistan, all US and coalition forces, should be withdrawn from the new Sunni and Shi’a states as soon as either is prepared to take responsibility for its own survival.

And that’s it.

This proposed solution is far from elegant -- but it would work, at least in the sense that it would end the present struggle of all against all by creating two mutually hostile states. Future conflict could thus be channeled and subsumed into a conflict of states – amenable to diplomatic, economic and military pressures by the international community.

There are other advantages. An independent Kurdistan would assure the United States of one strong, and militarily dependent, ally in Mesopotamia, while affording us the means of applying leverage against Syria and Iran through their Kurdish populations. Even at the price of strained relations with Turkey, Kurdistan would represent a net gain for US policy in the Middle East.

By creating a Sunni state without oil resources, the US would create the best possibility of a second emergent democracy in the former Iraq. I have long subscribed to Zakaria’s Law – the historical principle that democracy cannot flourish in a state which controls vast natural resources. The argument, as set forth in Fareed Zakaria’s The Future of Freedom, is that democratic institutions evolve from a state’s need for revenues, and its consequent negotiations with its productive classes to barter political and property rights in exchange for new taxes.

The new Sunni state might seem barren ground for a new democracy, but there is – or was, until the diaspora resulting from the present chaos – a substantial, educated professional class in the Sunni areas of Mesopotamia. Given a stable state with an infusion of regular, gradually declining, payments from Kurdistan, this Sunni state would have time to develop the productive commercial and industrial bases of a successful republic. In time, this might well lead to the emergence of democratic institutions.

I have less hope for the emergence of democracy in the new Shi’a state, which would be oil-rich and dominated by Islamic politicians. The best that can be said is that an Islamic Republic of Basra would be confined to one-half of the present territory of Iraq. There is, however, some reason for hope.

If, under our present policies, Iraq could somehow be held together, it would inevitably become dependent upon Iran. The Sunni minority would never accept a Shi’a-dominated government, and the resulting civil disorder would compel the Iraqi government – as US trioops withdrew – to look to Iran for support.

On the other hand, a majority Shi’a state, while likely to become a temporary client of Iran, would have less reason to remain so. Independently wealthy, and with less political instability to contend with, the new state would eventually assume its own sense of national identity. As an Arab state, it would gradually begin to perceive how its interests differed from those of its Persian neighbor.

The future I propose is far from ideal, but, as Lady Macbeth said, “What’s done cannot be undone.” Given the alternatives – a perpetual occupation or a withdrawal leaving chaos in its wake – the partition of Mesopotamia offers the best way out of a thoroughly bad situation.

But we must act quickly.