It all comes down to oil.
But for oil money, we would likely never have heard of George W. Bush. Or, for that matter, Osama bin Laden.
Ponder that.
Oil money funds the rising power of Iran – and, through Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. It provides much of the financing for Vladimir Putin’s resurgent, disturbingly neo-Soviet, Russia. It enables the Bolivarian revolution which threatens to sweep out of Venezuela to dominate the Caribbean and Latin America.
Even as oil money strengthens our adversaries, America keeps sending dollars abroad to support its oil habit – a fact which has transformed us from the world’s generous creditor into its biggest debtor. At its heart, our permanent trade imbalance has less to do with Wal-Mart than with the corner Exxon station.
Setting all that aside, emissions from automobiles play a critical role in the dawning emergency of global warming.
We must begin cutting back on our consumption of oil, and every thinking American knows it.
The problem is, of course, that our two political parties prefer to focus on replacing foreign oil with something else. Preferably, something produced domestically. Ideally, something produced in abundance in the politically-vital state of Iowa.
Which is simply no answer at all. A gallon of corn-based ethanol requires nearly a gallon of gasoline to produce – making the ethanol subsidy a poor bargain, but a magnificent political boondoggle.
Besides, even if we could grow our own, switching fuels would do little to slow the melting of polar ice-caps, the rising intensity of violent weather systems, the lengthening life-cycles of destructive insects, and the spread of tropical diseases into once-temperate zones.
To reduce our dependence on oil, while addressing global environmental catastrophe, we must use less energy.
To use a word grown curiously hateful to modern conservatives, we must conserve.
The most effective first step toward conservation would be to engage ordinary Americans in thinking seriously about how to reduce their individual reliance on gasoline. If we could do that, the rest would follow.
The proof? Consider what happened to the market for gas guzzlers during last summer’s spike in oil prices. Or the less dramatic, but equally significant, changes in driving behavior.
Market forces work. But that does not – must not – mean we should be entirely at the mercy of unregulated markets. We can manipulate markets to provide incentives for conservation – and the obvious way to do that is artificially to raise the price of gasoline and diesel fuel at the pump.
What we need, as every thoughtful American knows, is to raise the price of gasoline. And the obvious way to do that is through a whopping gasoline surtax, payable at the pump.
The problem with this obvious solution is politics. Big Oil, Detroit, and the Club for Greed would go after a surtax the way Big Pharma and the insurance industry went after the Clinton health reforms.
You can picture the TV ads.
Still, a gasoline surtax is the obvious answer. And, since Americans aren’t very good at trading short-term pain for long-term gain, we need a surtax that doesn’t hurt too much, too quickly, or cause massive disruptions in our lives.
Indeed, we need a surtax that is easy to avoid. Because, as much as Americans hate taxes, they love avoiding taxes even more.
What we need is a surtax that seriously influences energy consumption, but is relatively easy to beat.
Something like this...
A Federal surtax of $1.00 per gallon on gasoline (and diesel) – exempting each licensed, adult driver from the surtax on the first thirty gallons purchased each month.
With modern technology, it should be a simple matter to issue each licensed driver a magnetized card – like a valued customer discount card – which gas station pumps could be adjusted to read. The card would automatically exempt the bearer from the surtax for the first thirty gallons purchased each month. Beginning with the thirty-first gallon, the surtax would kick in.
The average American drives around 10,000 miles a year – about 30 gallons a month in a reasonably fuel-efficient vehicle. Thus, most Americans could avoid paying the tax by making minor modifications in their driving habits. Those who prefer driving gas guzzlers would have to get more creative – but most people could avoid the tax, with a bit of effort.
Such an easily avoided surtax would produce relatively little revenue, but it would work a gradual change in individual consciousness. Like dieters counting carbs, drivers would start keeping track of how many gallons they consumed each month.
Families would give more thought to consolidating trips. Those in the market for cars would look more seriously at fuel efficiency. Intelligent drivers would slow down a bit, which would make us all safer.
A surtax would also exercise a slight, but continuous pressure against long-distance commuting – thus working subtly to curtail suburban sprawl.
But the immediate impact of the surtax would be nothing compared to its long-term utility. Having established a method of encouraging conservation, we could gradually ratchet down the number of gallons exempted – say, one gallon every two years – until, in twenty years, the surtax applied to every gallon over twenty.
That’s a serious reduction in gasoline consumption – but one which allows plenty of time for Detroit to design sexy, fuel-efficient vehicles, and for developers to discover the potential of reviving our cities and close-in suburbs. Time, indeed, for our metropolitan areas to get serious about mass transit.
A surtax along these lines would provide a flexible tool for gradually moving America toward serious energy conservation. It wouldn’t be painless, but it would minimize disruption while imposing a slow, steady market pressure in favor of energy conservation.
And it would square with what we know about Americans’ attitudes toward taxes. By involving all of us in a perpetual hunt for new ways to avoid using more than the exempted number of gallons each month, it would enlist American ingenuity in a permanent search for ways to reduce our dependence on oil.
Worth a try, don’t you think?
Wednesday, December 27, 2006
Wednesday, December 20, 2006
No Virginia, There's No Obama Claus!
[Owing to the hustle and bustle of the Christmas season, I've opted to post my piece in this week's Village News rather than write something uniquely for Gray's Gazette. I trust you will find it worthwhile. RG]
I was probably eight or nine when I started questioning the stories. Anyway, old enough to have mastered long division and to have a basic grasp of geography.
I asked Dad how many people lived in the world. Armed with this information, I did two calculations.
Assuming, naively, that most people lived in families like ours, I divided Dad’s figure by four to derive the number of houses in the world. I divided the result by 24, which I took to be the number of hours Santa Claus – by following the sun – would have to complete his deliveries in a single night.
Studying the result – the number of houses per hour Santa would have to visit – I drew the only logical conclusion. Which was fine, until I decided to share it with my little sister, who didn’t take it well.
Dad then sat me down for a serious talk about the difference between being a good thinker and a good big brother.
This episode stays with me – as does the moral Dad drew. It’s great if a little kid can use logic and long division to solve childhood’s most urgent existential problem – but nobody likes the bearer of ill tidings.
Which is why I approach today’s topic with some trepidation.
At present, all over America, desperate Democrats, liberal independents, idealistic youth, and disciples of Oprah are working themselves into a frenzy about Senator Barack Obama. They’re starting to believe – they want so much to believe – that this bright, engaging young politician is the answer to our nation’s prayers.
And I can’t see it.
Senator Obama might someday be president – perhaps even a great one. But if he runs now – on the message that has propelled him to such sudden and remarkable popularity – I fear he’s doomed to failure.
Because Senator Obama is suggesting that we can have Christmas all year ‘round. He’s selling America the heartwarming Hollywood ending in which everyone comes together as one – the final scene of It’s a Wonderful Life; the cheering crowd scenes at the end of Rocky II, Hoosiers, and a hundred underdog films; Tinker Bell reviving because we all believe – and clap our hands.
Senator Obama has latched onto the popular illusion that democracy would be ever so nice if we all set aside our personal interests, freed ourselves from hatred and prejudice, and dismissed our philosophical differences as just so much idle speculation.
He’s asking why we can’t all get along – and ignoring the obvious answer.
Because we’re not saints.
In this real world, each of us pursues real interests and ambitions. All of us are hampered by hatreds and prejudices inherited from our backgrounds or engendered by personal experiences. And none of us knows everything – or understands everything he knows.
Because this is so, in any society, conflict is inevitable. Especially in a free and democratic society.
We may tell pollsters that we want an end to partisan politics – but pollsters seldom ask which of our personal interests or beliefs we’d be willing to sacrifice for the sake of unity.
Thus, polls fail to disclose that the only bipartisanship most of us would actually accept is one in which those who disagree with us shut up and allowed us to do things our way.
And that’s precisely why Senator Obama is not – and cannot be – what so many Americans want him to be.
He’s obviously an attractive candidate. He might even ride this hunger for unity to the White House.
But once in office, he’d have decisions to make. Every decision would produce winners and losers. And very quickly, Americans would begin to remember that – barring exceptional times of emergency, mourning or celebration – a President can’t really bring us together.
No one can.
At this season, we celebrate the birth of an infant who grew up to preach a gospel of universal brotherhood and peace.
He was killed for it – as were Martin Luther King, Jr., Mohandas K. Gandhi, and thousands of others, famous and obscure, across the bloody pages of human history.
Which is not to say that the dream – of unity, brotherhood, universal peace – is a lie. The dream is as real as Santa Claus.
But it isn’t the end of the story.
On the day after Christmas, after a long hot bath and lots of Ben-Gay, Santa must start planning the logistics for next Christmas. George Bailey must reopen the Building & Loan and start figuring out how to repay his neighbors’ generosity.
And we must all face jobs and homework; bills, mortgages, and tuition; and the thousand-and-one challenges involved in the pursuit of happiness in a fast-paced, complex society.
Which is why Christmas is so essential. We need this time – so rare in the calendar – to set aside our differences and celebrate the things that unite us.
But what makes Christmas essential is precisely what makes a perpetual Christmas impossible.
Just like the sort of bloodless, non-partisan unity Senator Obama is selling.
I was probably eight or nine when I started questioning the stories. Anyway, old enough to have mastered long division and to have a basic grasp of geography.
I asked Dad how many people lived in the world. Armed with this information, I did two calculations.
Assuming, naively, that most people lived in families like ours, I divided Dad’s figure by four to derive the number of houses in the world. I divided the result by 24, which I took to be the number of hours Santa Claus – by following the sun – would have to complete his deliveries in a single night.
Studying the result – the number of houses per hour Santa would have to visit – I drew the only logical conclusion. Which was fine, until I decided to share it with my little sister, who didn’t take it well.
Dad then sat me down for a serious talk about the difference between being a good thinker and a good big brother.
This episode stays with me – as does the moral Dad drew. It’s great if a little kid can use logic and long division to solve childhood’s most urgent existential problem – but nobody likes the bearer of ill tidings.
Which is why I approach today’s topic with some trepidation.
At present, all over America, desperate Democrats, liberal independents, idealistic youth, and disciples of Oprah are working themselves into a frenzy about Senator Barack Obama. They’re starting to believe – they want so much to believe – that this bright, engaging young politician is the answer to our nation’s prayers.
And I can’t see it.
Senator Obama might someday be president – perhaps even a great one. But if he runs now – on the message that has propelled him to such sudden and remarkable popularity – I fear he’s doomed to failure.
Because Senator Obama is suggesting that we can have Christmas all year ‘round. He’s selling America the heartwarming Hollywood ending in which everyone comes together as one – the final scene of It’s a Wonderful Life; the cheering crowd scenes at the end of Rocky II, Hoosiers, and a hundred underdog films; Tinker Bell reviving because we all believe – and clap our hands.
Senator Obama has latched onto the popular illusion that democracy would be ever so nice if we all set aside our personal interests, freed ourselves from hatred and prejudice, and dismissed our philosophical differences as just so much idle speculation.
He’s asking why we can’t all get along – and ignoring the obvious answer.
Because we’re not saints.
In this real world, each of us pursues real interests and ambitions. All of us are hampered by hatreds and prejudices inherited from our backgrounds or engendered by personal experiences. And none of us knows everything – or understands everything he knows.
Because this is so, in any society, conflict is inevitable. Especially in a free and democratic society.
We may tell pollsters that we want an end to partisan politics – but pollsters seldom ask which of our personal interests or beliefs we’d be willing to sacrifice for the sake of unity.
Thus, polls fail to disclose that the only bipartisanship most of us would actually accept is one in which those who disagree with us shut up and allowed us to do things our way.
And that’s precisely why Senator Obama is not – and cannot be – what so many Americans want him to be.
He’s obviously an attractive candidate. He might even ride this hunger for unity to the White House.
But once in office, he’d have decisions to make. Every decision would produce winners and losers. And very quickly, Americans would begin to remember that – barring exceptional times of emergency, mourning or celebration – a President can’t really bring us together.
No one can.
At this season, we celebrate the birth of an infant who grew up to preach a gospel of universal brotherhood and peace.
He was killed for it – as were Martin Luther King, Jr., Mohandas K. Gandhi, and thousands of others, famous and obscure, across the bloody pages of human history.
Which is not to say that the dream – of unity, brotherhood, universal peace – is a lie. The dream is as real as Santa Claus.
But it isn’t the end of the story.
On the day after Christmas, after a long hot bath and lots of Ben-Gay, Santa must start planning the logistics for next Christmas. George Bailey must reopen the Building & Loan and start figuring out how to repay his neighbors’ generosity.
And we must all face jobs and homework; bills, mortgages, and tuition; and the thousand-and-one challenges involved in the pursuit of happiness in a fast-paced, complex society.
Which is why Christmas is so essential. We need this time – so rare in the calendar – to set aside our differences and celebrate the things that unite us.
But what makes Christmas essential is precisely what makes a perpetual Christmas impossible.
Just like the sort of bloodless, non-partisan unity Senator Obama is selling.
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
The Slow Death of the Democratic Party, Part Two
In my previous posting, I suggested that the Democratic Party appears to be traveling down a path to destruction first blazed by the 19th century Whigs. Today, I’d like to bring those musings into the present day.
First, a partial disclaimer. Historical parallels are a tricky business. Heraclitus rightly observed that “you cannot step twice into the same river”, for history never precisely repeats itself.
But there are patterns. In many ways, history is the unfolding story of human nature writ large – and human nature changes, if at all, at evolutionary speed. Which is why we can still suffer with Job, feel fear and pity watching Greek tragedy, and delight in good productions of Shakespeare.
It is also why nearly every great leader – from every era – has been a student of history.
Because history instructs us, I devoted my last posting to a consideration of the demise of the Whig Party in the 1850's. To summarize, I suggested three major themes:
First, that American political parties – like many human institutions – are permanently defined by the circumstances of their creation. However they may evolve over time, they can never escape the organizational DNA which went into their original organizations.
Second, that political parties begin to die when they begin defining themselves in terms of another party or parties. Stated another way, a party which loses the ability to define a vision of the future – in its own terms – is in grave peril.
Third, that, because America’s two-party system is largely self-perpetuating, a political party can survive for a long time despite dysfunctional organizational DNA and the loss of vision – but that it will eventually shatter when confronted by a great emerging issue it cannot address.
My purpose here is to suggest that the Democratic Party’s organizational DNA is ill-suited to the 21st century – or indeed, to the world of the late 20th century; that, in response to the Reagan Revolution, the Democrats have lost – perhaps irretrievably – their ability to define a vision for America’s future; and that, given those weaknesses, the Democrats now face a cluster of related issues which they may well prove unable to negotiate.
Beginning with the Democratic DNA, one critical weakness in the party has been, from its inception, an excessive reliance upon Presidential leadership. And this makes sense, given that the party was founded in direct reaction against the alleged “corrupt bargain” which denied Andrew Jackson the presidency in 1824. Party organization developed around the national convention, which focused the attention of party leaders on the business of nominating a presidential candidate. Jackson, the party’s founder and first President, was an extreme exponent of executive power – to a degree unprecedented at the time, and not to be seen again in peacetime until the late 20th century.
Throughout its history, the Democratic Party has measured its achievements in terms of its great and near-great Presidents. Unlike the Republicans, the Democratic Party can celebrate no period during which it achieved significant progress primarily under Congressional leadership.
Not surprisingly, then, Democrats have less to show for their periods of legislative control except when the White House was simultaneously held by a strong Democratic president. To a far greater degree than their Republican colleagues, Democratic Senators tend to neglect the possibilities of legislative achievement in order to pursue their own presidential ambitions – a fact which, ironically, makes it difficult for any Democratic president to cooperate effectively with a Senate thronging with his potential successors.
Even today, the newly elected Democratic Congressional majority – swept to power on a wave of public revulsion over the chaos in Mesopotamia – has no plan for ending the war. Indeed, despite the undeniable fact that the war authorized in 2002 – a war against the Saddamist regime – has been over for three years, the incoming Congressional leadership has dismissed out of hand the option of ending American involvement by cutting off funds.
It is, of course, utterly impossible to imagine Newt Gingrich, Tom DeLay, or Bob Dole adopting such a posture of unilateral disarmament. The leadership of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid has started by tying its own hands – a dark omen for the next two years.
The Democrats’ presidential obsession has meant that – to an unhealthy degree – the Party has permitted itself to be redefined every four years by whichever candidate secures its nomination. It has also gradually led the party from a pattern of glorifying past heroes (FDR, Truman, JFK, etc.) to a perpetual search for the next great savior-leader who will rescue the party from obscurity.
The present “rock star” status of Barack Obama – a man of undoubted ability but precious little governmental experience or achievement – is only the latest instance of the Democrats’ chronic desperation.
The second weakness in the Democratic DNA is, simply, that the Party has always been more a coalition than a movement. Arising, as it did, during a period of pronounced sectionalism, the Democratic Party necessarily played down internal differences while focusing upon the personality of Andrew Jackson.
This fact has never really changed. Today’s Democratic Party can most readily be defined by listing its major component groups: labor, particularly the teacher’s unions; African-Americans; feminists and pro-choicers; anti-war voters; senior citizens; and trial lawyers.
The fact that most of these groups are declining as a percentage of the American population is disturbing enough. The fact that each group wields an effective veto over new policy initiatives has – in recent administrations – entirely thwarted the efforts of Democratic presidents to fulfill the dynamic role assigned to them by their party.
In addition to its increasingly dysfunctional DNA, the Democratic Party has, since the Reagan Era, shifted almost entirely into a negative mindset. Anyone who has spent time among Democrats will know that party activists focus far too much of their energy on denunciations of their partisan foes – often in the most intemperate language – and far too little on developing workable policy proposals.
Since Jackson’s day, Democrats have been great haters, but historically, they have also been great dreamers. This is, quite simply, no longer true. JFK and LBJ were the last Democratic presidents to set forth – and follow through on – bold new undertakings. During the 1980’s, Ronald Reagan, an erstwhile New Deal Democrat, borrowed FDR’s visionary vocabulary – and the Republicans have never given it back.
Thus, even today, with new Congressional majorities and a phalanx of Presidential candidates, not one Democrat seems capable of enunciating a bold vision for a better America. George W. Bush may be the lamest of ducks, but the far-too-loyal opposition continues to allow him to set the national agenda – and the terms of debate.
All in all, then, the Democratic Party of today seems incapable performing either of the essential functions of a political party – offering an alternative vision when in opposition, or governing when in power.
Obsessed with presidential leadership, Democrats seem determined to squander their new legislative majorities while waiting for a new Moses to lead them out of the last four decades of political imbecility.
Paralyzed by the incompatible elements within their coalition, they seem entirely unable to proclaim a vision for a better America
Meanwhile, a cluster of intractable challenges – the widening gap between the secure and the insecure in America; declining educational quality for most young Americans; growing trade and Federal deficits; a global environmental crisis; America’s excessive dependence upon non-renewable energy sources; and the persistence of terror networks intent upon doing Americans harm – is coming together to form a perfect political storm.
The name of that storm is the 21st Century – or, as seems increasingly likely, the Post-American Century.
A party capable of governing – or worthy of survival – would not only offer a plan for meeting this perfect storm, but a vision of calm seas and favorable winds on the other side.
Incapable of either, the Democratic Party seems doomed to break apart in the rough seas which are now overtaking it.
First, a partial disclaimer. Historical parallels are a tricky business. Heraclitus rightly observed that “you cannot step twice into the same river”, for history never precisely repeats itself.
But there are patterns. In many ways, history is the unfolding story of human nature writ large – and human nature changes, if at all, at evolutionary speed. Which is why we can still suffer with Job, feel fear and pity watching Greek tragedy, and delight in good productions of Shakespeare.
It is also why nearly every great leader – from every era – has been a student of history.
Because history instructs us, I devoted my last posting to a consideration of the demise of the Whig Party in the 1850's. To summarize, I suggested three major themes:
First, that American political parties – like many human institutions – are permanently defined by the circumstances of their creation. However they may evolve over time, they can never escape the organizational DNA which went into their original organizations.
Second, that political parties begin to die when they begin defining themselves in terms of another party or parties. Stated another way, a party which loses the ability to define a vision of the future – in its own terms – is in grave peril.
Third, that, because America’s two-party system is largely self-perpetuating, a political party can survive for a long time despite dysfunctional organizational DNA and the loss of vision – but that it will eventually shatter when confronted by a great emerging issue it cannot address.
My purpose here is to suggest that the Democratic Party’s organizational DNA is ill-suited to the 21st century – or indeed, to the world of the late 20th century; that, in response to the Reagan Revolution, the Democrats have lost – perhaps irretrievably – their ability to define a vision for America’s future; and that, given those weaknesses, the Democrats now face a cluster of related issues which they may well prove unable to negotiate.
Beginning with the Democratic DNA, one critical weakness in the party has been, from its inception, an excessive reliance upon Presidential leadership. And this makes sense, given that the party was founded in direct reaction against the alleged “corrupt bargain” which denied Andrew Jackson the presidency in 1824. Party organization developed around the national convention, which focused the attention of party leaders on the business of nominating a presidential candidate. Jackson, the party’s founder and first President, was an extreme exponent of executive power – to a degree unprecedented at the time, and not to be seen again in peacetime until the late 20th century.
Throughout its history, the Democratic Party has measured its achievements in terms of its great and near-great Presidents. Unlike the Republicans, the Democratic Party can celebrate no period during which it achieved significant progress primarily under Congressional leadership.
Not surprisingly, then, Democrats have less to show for their periods of legislative control except when the White House was simultaneously held by a strong Democratic president. To a far greater degree than their Republican colleagues, Democratic Senators tend to neglect the possibilities of legislative achievement in order to pursue their own presidential ambitions – a fact which, ironically, makes it difficult for any Democratic president to cooperate effectively with a Senate thronging with his potential successors.
Even today, the newly elected Democratic Congressional majority – swept to power on a wave of public revulsion over the chaos in Mesopotamia – has no plan for ending the war. Indeed, despite the undeniable fact that the war authorized in 2002 – a war against the Saddamist regime – has been over for three years, the incoming Congressional leadership has dismissed out of hand the option of ending American involvement by cutting off funds.
It is, of course, utterly impossible to imagine Newt Gingrich, Tom DeLay, or Bob Dole adopting such a posture of unilateral disarmament. The leadership of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid has started by tying its own hands – a dark omen for the next two years.
The Democrats’ presidential obsession has meant that – to an unhealthy degree – the Party has permitted itself to be redefined every four years by whichever candidate secures its nomination. It has also gradually led the party from a pattern of glorifying past heroes (FDR, Truman, JFK, etc.) to a perpetual search for the next great savior-leader who will rescue the party from obscurity.
The present “rock star” status of Barack Obama – a man of undoubted ability but precious little governmental experience or achievement – is only the latest instance of the Democrats’ chronic desperation.
The second weakness in the Democratic DNA is, simply, that the Party has always been more a coalition than a movement. Arising, as it did, during a period of pronounced sectionalism, the Democratic Party necessarily played down internal differences while focusing upon the personality of Andrew Jackson.
This fact has never really changed. Today’s Democratic Party can most readily be defined by listing its major component groups: labor, particularly the teacher’s unions; African-Americans; feminists and pro-choicers; anti-war voters; senior citizens; and trial lawyers.
The fact that most of these groups are declining as a percentage of the American population is disturbing enough. The fact that each group wields an effective veto over new policy initiatives has – in recent administrations – entirely thwarted the efforts of Democratic presidents to fulfill the dynamic role assigned to them by their party.
In addition to its increasingly dysfunctional DNA, the Democratic Party has, since the Reagan Era, shifted almost entirely into a negative mindset. Anyone who has spent time among Democrats will know that party activists focus far too much of their energy on denunciations of their partisan foes – often in the most intemperate language – and far too little on developing workable policy proposals.
Since Jackson’s day, Democrats have been great haters, but historically, they have also been great dreamers. This is, quite simply, no longer true. JFK and LBJ were the last Democratic presidents to set forth – and follow through on – bold new undertakings. During the 1980’s, Ronald Reagan, an erstwhile New Deal Democrat, borrowed FDR’s visionary vocabulary – and the Republicans have never given it back.
Thus, even today, with new Congressional majorities and a phalanx of Presidential candidates, not one Democrat seems capable of enunciating a bold vision for a better America. George W. Bush may be the lamest of ducks, but the far-too-loyal opposition continues to allow him to set the national agenda – and the terms of debate.
All in all, then, the Democratic Party of today seems incapable performing either of the essential functions of a political party – offering an alternative vision when in opposition, or governing when in power.
Obsessed with presidential leadership, Democrats seem determined to squander their new legislative majorities while waiting for a new Moses to lead them out of the last four decades of political imbecility.
Paralyzed by the incompatible elements within their coalition, they seem entirely unable to proclaim a vision for a better America
Meanwhile, a cluster of intractable challenges – the widening gap between the secure and the insecure in America; declining educational quality for most young Americans; growing trade and Federal deficits; a global environmental crisis; America’s excessive dependence upon non-renewable energy sources; and the persistence of terror networks intent upon doing Americans harm – is coming together to form a perfect political storm.
The name of that storm is the 21st Century – or, as seems increasingly likely, the Post-American Century.
A party capable of governing – or worthy of survival – would not only offer a plan for meeting this perfect storm, but a vision of calm seas and favorable winds on the other side.
Incapable of either, the Democratic Party seems doomed to break apart in the rough seas which are now overtaking it.
Monday, December 11, 2006
The Slow Death of the Democratic Party
For all but a handful of its 217 years, the United States has operated under a two-party system. The names and identities of the two parties have changed from time to time, but not that essential fact. For whatever reason – and the explanations are legion – Americans seem to prefer the two-party model.
Given that fact, it has been monumentally difficult for even the most muddleheaded incompetence to kill off one of the existing political parties. Only twice, thus far, has the death of a major party made room for the rise of something new.
But it might be happening again.
In the early 1800’s, the Federalists managed to do themselves in out of sheer, aristocratic arrogance – but only because of the untimely death of Alexander Hamilton, a genius who combined the political shrewdness of Karl Rove with the ability to – you know – govern effectively.
The demise of the Federalists led to a brief period of one-party rule – the curiously misnamed “Era of Good Feelings”. This ended in 1824, when Americans experienced the only presidential election to be conducted along the lines the Founders had imagined when they drafted the Constitution. Four candidates – John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, William H. Crawford, and Henry Clay – divided the electoral vote, and the House of Representatives chose among the top three.
Curiously, Clay – the odd man out – was Speaker of the House, and thus in position to throw the election to one of his erstwhile rivals. He chose Adams, who had finished second to Jackson in the electoral and popular votes. Jackson, infuriated, stormed off to found the Democratic Party.
Within a decade, Jackson’s opponents had coalesced into the Whig Party, which enjoyed apparent success for some twenty years before suddenly imploding in the mid-1850's. The death of the Whigs came as a shock to many, but it made room for the emergence of the Republicans – and Abraham Lincoln.
Which brings us to the point of this brief historical review. Leaving out the haughty Federalists, who never entirely reconciled themselves to the dirty business of seeking votes among hoi polloi, the Whigs have been the only major American party – so far – to die.
The reasons for the Whigs’ collapse are complex. Serious readers will find a brilliant introduction in David M. Potter’s 1976 classic, The Impending Crisis: 1848 - 1861, but for my purposes, I will focus upon my own favorite theory – that the fatal weakness of the Whigs lay in their origins.
Having arisen in opposition to Andrew Jackson – the dominant figure of the era – the Whigs adopted the tactics of an opposition party. They imitated Democratic organizational forms, campaign methods, and – when possible – candidates. They defined themselves largely in response to Democratic initiatives – particularly Manifest Destiny – rather than setting forth an alternative vision of America’s future.
And they were flagrantly opportunistic. In 1836, having no candidate capable of defeating Martin van Buren, the proto-Whig opposition ran three regional candidates – hoping thereby to throw the election into the House of Representatives.
In 1840, the Whigs nominated an Indian fighter, William Henry Harrison, hoping to portray him as a second Andrew Jackson. To strengthen their ticket, they actually nominated an anti-Jackson Democrat, John Tyler, for Vice President – with the curious result that the first Whig administration was led, for three years and eleven months, by a member of their rival party.
In 1848 and 1852, the Whigs nominated military heroes with neither political skills nor experience. They got lucky when the tactless Zachary Taylor died, putting the politically adept Millard Fillmore in the White House just in time to play a crucial role in engineering the Compromise of 1850. They got lucky again when the bombastic Winfield Scott lost in 1852.
All in all, like many human institutions, the Whigs never succeeded in transcending their origins. They did well enough during the 1840's, under the leadership of great statesmen like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, but they never succeeded in putting one of these giants in the White House.
With the passing of the giants, the Whigs – an opposition party defined by opportunism – drifted toward their doom. They finally went to pieces when confronted by an issue which offered no room for opportunistic maneuvering – the expansion of slavery into the West.
For some time now, I have been impressed with the parallels between the long-ago Whigs and the modern Democrats. Of course, the Democrats, unlike the short-lived Whigs, have been around for nearly two centuries. However, since the rise of Ronald Reagan – a titanic figure who resembles Andrew Jackson in many ways – the Democrats have redefined themselves largely as an opposition party, with all the weaknesses such a posture implies.
In my next posting, I will explore the weaknesses, perhaps fatal, of the modern Democratic Party. In future postings, I’ll examine my reasons for thinking that the death of the Democratic Party, should it occur, might not be altogether bad for America – or the cause of American liberalism.
Given that fact, it has been monumentally difficult for even the most muddleheaded incompetence to kill off one of the existing political parties. Only twice, thus far, has the death of a major party made room for the rise of something new.
But it might be happening again.
In the early 1800’s, the Federalists managed to do themselves in out of sheer, aristocratic arrogance – but only because of the untimely death of Alexander Hamilton, a genius who combined the political shrewdness of Karl Rove with the ability to – you know – govern effectively.
The demise of the Federalists led to a brief period of one-party rule – the curiously misnamed “Era of Good Feelings”. This ended in 1824, when Americans experienced the only presidential election to be conducted along the lines the Founders had imagined when they drafted the Constitution. Four candidates – John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, William H. Crawford, and Henry Clay – divided the electoral vote, and the House of Representatives chose among the top three.
Curiously, Clay – the odd man out – was Speaker of the House, and thus in position to throw the election to one of his erstwhile rivals. He chose Adams, who had finished second to Jackson in the electoral and popular votes. Jackson, infuriated, stormed off to found the Democratic Party.
Within a decade, Jackson’s opponents had coalesced into the Whig Party, which enjoyed apparent success for some twenty years before suddenly imploding in the mid-1850's. The death of the Whigs came as a shock to many, but it made room for the emergence of the Republicans – and Abraham Lincoln.
Which brings us to the point of this brief historical review. Leaving out the haughty Federalists, who never entirely reconciled themselves to the dirty business of seeking votes among hoi polloi, the Whigs have been the only major American party – so far – to die.
The reasons for the Whigs’ collapse are complex. Serious readers will find a brilliant introduction in David M. Potter’s 1976 classic, The Impending Crisis: 1848 - 1861, but for my purposes, I will focus upon my own favorite theory – that the fatal weakness of the Whigs lay in their origins.
Having arisen in opposition to Andrew Jackson – the dominant figure of the era – the Whigs adopted the tactics of an opposition party. They imitated Democratic organizational forms, campaign methods, and – when possible – candidates. They defined themselves largely in response to Democratic initiatives – particularly Manifest Destiny – rather than setting forth an alternative vision of America’s future.
And they were flagrantly opportunistic. In 1836, having no candidate capable of defeating Martin van Buren, the proto-Whig opposition ran three regional candidates – hoping thereby to throw the election into the House of Representatives.
In 1840, the Whigs nominated an Indian fighter, William Henry Harrison, hoping to portray him as a second Andrew Jackson. To strengthen their ticket, they actually nominated an anti-Jackson Democrat, John Tyler, for Vice President – with the curious result that the first Whig administration was led, for three years and eleven months, by a member of their rival party.
In 1848 and 1852, the Whigs nominated military heroes with neither political skills nor experience. They got lucky when the tactless Zachary Taylor died, putting the politically adept Millard Fillmore in the White House just in time to play a crucial role in engineering the Compromise of 1850. They got lucky again when the bombastic Winfield Scott lost in 1852.
All in all, like many human institutions, the Whigs never succeeded in transcending their origins. They did well enough during the 1840's, under the leadership of great statesmen like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, but they never succeeded in putting one of these giants in the White House.
With the passing of the giants, the Whigs – an opposition party defined by opportunism – drifted toward their doom. They finally went to pieces when confronted by an issue which offered no room for opportunistic maneuvering – the expansion of slavery into the West.
For some time now, I have been impressed with the parallels between the long-ago Whigs and the modern Democrats. Of course, the Democrats, unlike the short-lived Whigs, have been around for nearly two centuries. However, since the rise of Ronald Reagan – a titanic figure who resembles Andrew Jackson in many ways – the Democrats have redefined themselves largely as an opposition party, with all the weaknesses such a posture implies.
In my next posting, I will explore the weaknesses, perhaps fatal, of the modern Democratic Party. In future postings, I’ll examine my reasons for thinking that the death of the Democratic Party, should it occur, might not be altogether bad for America – or the cause of American liberalism.
Wednesday, December 6, 2006
Solving the Mess in Mesopotamia, Part Two.
In my previous post, I focused on the political situation in the US, which, in my judgment, renders improbable an acceptable resolution of the mess in Mesopotamia.
Nonetheless, I promised to set forth what I would do, if I were President. It’s easy to deplore the present lowering of expectations for Iraq’s future and wash our hands of the business – yet that tendency, in itself, merely offers our political leaders an excuse for their failure to think creatively and act boldly.
Bad as the situation is, there are things the US can do to make the best of a bad situation. But to act, we must first assess the situation.
Here’s how I see it:
First, there is no longer any such thing as Iraq. The US has irrevocably destroyed the state Saddam ruled with such malign, but effective, ruthlessness. Like Yugoslavia after Tito, Iraq has come permanently undone. Through a brutal process of sectarian cleansing and forced migration, three small nations are emerging from this wreckage – corresponding roughly, but not precisely, to the historic Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. It is, thus, more useful to speak of “Mesopotamia” than of the late, departed state of Iraq.
Second, the present situation in Iraq is not a civil war, but what has been called a “Hobbesian war” – a war of all against all. A straightforward civil war between two well-governed sections – like the war of 1861-1865 – would be vastly preferable to the present situation.
These two propositions I regard as indisputable. For the rest, I would act on the basis of six assumptions, as follow:
· Whatever they want, most Mesopotamian Shi’ites would accept control of substantial oil resources and freedom from their lingering dread of a Saddamist revival.
· Whatever they want, most Mesopotamian Sunnis would accept a reasonable share of oil revenues and freedom from the fear of oppression by an Islamist Shi’ite state.
· The Kurds would be delighted with independence, protection against Turkish intervention, and control of Kirkuk and Mosul. Given these things, the Kurds would become a key, relatively democratic US ally.
· Most of the violence in Mesopotamia results either from mutual sectarian fears or resentment of US actions which appear – to each sect – to favor the other.
· America’s only long-term enemies in Mesopotamia are a small Al Qaeda operation (based in the Sunni Triangle) and operatives loyal to Iran and Syria. Once American forces are withdrawn, most interests in Mesopotamia would be prepared to deal with us on a basis of rational self-interest.
· With American public opinion turning rapidly toward an immediate pullout, any constructive action must be taken quickly, or not at all.
Obviously, all of my assumptions are debatable, but debating them is not my purpose here. Instead, I propose to use them in constructing a plan for extricating the US from Mesopotamia without leaving behind a vacuum which will breed endless future trouble for its neighbors – and for us.
This plan would begin with the partition of Mesopotamia into three new states. The US, preferably with British cooperation, would act unilaterally to create a fait accompli on the ground. While the government of Kurdistan should be consulted, it would be pointless to attempt negotiations with the failed Iraqi government or the various sectarian and tribal interests. Population and border adjustments might come in future years, through diplomacy or war, but that is not our concern. Our purpose now should be to create three stable states capable of sustaining themselves during a period of transition and with a reasonable chance of surviving into the future.
The borders of the new Kurdistan should include the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, their adjacent oil fields, and a defensible buffer zone beyond. US forces should be deployed to secure this border and deter invention by Turkey, Iran, or Syria.
In return for the acquisition of disputed territory and resources, the Kurds should agree to pay a substantial, gradually declining, portion of their oil revenues to a stable Sunni state, so long as it maintains peaceful relations with Kurdistan. In return for a US guarantee of sovereignty, the Kurds should be placed on notice that the US reserves the right to withdraw its protection should they sponsor Kurdish separatism in Turkey – or, without our blessing, in Iran or Syria.
The borders of the Sunni state should include majority Sunni areas, including West Baghdad – but excluding the volatile Anbar province. US troops – joined or succeeded, if it can be arranged – by troops from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other friendly Muslim states – should occupy Anbar in force for a period of five years in order to round up Al Qaeda cells and give the Sunni state time to establish itself. Thereafter, if pacified, Anbar could be permitted to join the Sunni state.
The Shi’ite state would include the remainder of Mesopotamia, excluding East Baghdad. East Baghdad – the political base of Muktada al Sadr – would, like Anbar, be heavily occupied by US troops while the new state got on its feet under other leadership. In this case, US occupation would end as soon as the Shi’ite state was prepared to assume control.
Finally, while the US should negotiate for long-term bases in Kurdistan, all US and coalition forces, should be withdrawn from the new Sunni and Shi’a states as soon as either is prepared to take responsibility for its own survival.
And that’s it.
This proposed solution is far from elegant -- but it would work, at least in the sense that it would end the present struggle of all against all by creating two mutually hostile states. Future conflict could thus be channeled and subsumed into a conflict of states – amenable to diplomatic, economic and military pressures by the international community.
There are other advantages. An independent Kurdistan would assure the United States of one strong, and militarily dependent, ally in Mesopotamia, while affording us the means of applying leverage against Syria and Iran through their Kurdish populations. Even at the price of strained relations with Turkey, Kurdistan would represent a net gain for US policy in the Middle East.
By creating a Sunni state without oil resources, the US would create the best possibility of a second emergent democracy in the former Iraq. I have long subscribed to Zakaria’s Law – the historical principle that democracy cannot flourish in a state which controls vast natural resources. The argument, as set forth in Fareed Zakaria’s The Future of Freedom, is that democratic institutions evolve from a state’s need for revenues, and its consequent negotiations with its productive classes to barter political and property rights in exchange for new taxes.
The new Sunni state might seem barren ground for a new democracy, but there is – or was, until the diaspora resulting from the present chaos – a substantial, educated professional class in the Sunni areas of Mesopotamia. Given a stable state with an infusion of regular, gradually declining, payments from Kurdistan, this Sunni state would have time to develop the productive commercial and industrial bases of a successful republic. In time, this might well lead to the emergence of democratic institutions.
I have less hope for the emergence of democracy in the new Shi’a state, which would be oil-rich and dominated by Islamic politicians. The best that can be said is that an Islamic Republic of Basra would be confined to one-half of the present territory of Iraq. There is, however, some reason for hope.
If, under our present policies, Iraq could somehow be held together, it would inevitably become dependent upon Iran. The Sunni minority would never accept a Shi’a-dominated government, and the resulting civil disorder would compel the Iraqi government – as US trioops withdrew – to look to Iran for support.
On the other hand, a majority Shi’a state, while likely to become a temporary client of Iran, would have less reason to remain so. Independently wealthy, and with less political instability to contend with, the new state would eventually assume its own sense of national identity. As an Arab state, it would gradually begin to perceive how its interests differed from those of its Persian neighbor.
The future I propose is far from ideal, but, as Lady Macbeth said, “What’s done cannot be undone.” Given the alternatives – a perpetual occupation or a withdrawal leaving chaos in its wake – the partition of Mesopotamia offers the best way out of a thoroughly bad situation.
But we must act quickly.
Nonetheless, I promised to set forth what I would do, if I were President. It’s easy to deplore the present lowering of expectations for Iraq’s future and wash our hands of the business – yet that tendency, in itself, merely offers our political leaders an excuse for their failure to think creatively and act boldly.
Bad as the situation is, there are things the US can do to make the best of a bad situation. But to act, we must first assess the situation.
Here’s how I see it:
First, there is no longer any such thing as Iraq. The US has irrevocably destroyed the state Saddam ruled with such malign, but effective, ruthlessness. Like Yugoslavia after Tito, Iraq has come permanently undone. Through a brutal process of sectarian cleansing and forced migration, three small nations are emerging from this wreckage – corresponding roughly, but not precisely, to the historic Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. It is, thus, more useful to speak of “Mesopotamia” than of the late, departed state of Iraq.
Second, the present situation in Iraq is not a civil war, but what has been called a “Hobbesian war” – a war of all against all. A straightforward civil war between two well-governed sections – like the war of 1861-1865 – would be vastly preferable to the present situation.
These two propositions I regard as indisputable. For the rest, I would act on the basis of six assumptions, as follow:
· Whatever they want, most Mesopotamian Shi’ites would accept control of substantial oil resources and freedom from their lingering dread of a Saddamist revival.
· Whatever they want, most Mesopotamian Sunnis would accept a reasonable share of oil revenues and freedom from the fear of oppression by an Islamist Shi’ite state.
· The Kurds would be delighted with independence, protection against Turkish intervention, and control of Kirkuk and Mosul. Given these things, the Kurds would become a key, relatively democratic US ally.
· Most of the violence in Mesopotamia results either from mutual sectarian fears or resentment of US actions which appear – to each sect – to favor the other.
· America’s only long-term enemies in Mesopotamia are a small Al Qaeda operation (based in the Sunni Triangle) and operatives loyal to Iran and Syria. Once American forces are withdrawn, most interests in Mesopotamia would be prepared to deal with us on a basis of rational self-interest.
· With American public opinion turning rapidly toward an immediate pullout, any constructive action must be taken quickly, or not at all.
Obviously, all of my assumptions are debatable, but debating them is not my purpose here. Instead, I propose to use them in constructing a plan for extricating the US from Mesopotamia without leaving behind a vacuum which will breed endless future trouble for its neighbors – and for us.
This plan would begin with the partition of Mesopotamia into three new states. The US, preferably with British cooperation, would act unilaterally to create a fait accompli on the ground. While the government of Kurdistan should be consulted, it would be pointless to attempt negotiations with the failed Iraqi government or the various sectarian and tribal interests. Population and border adjustments might come in future years, through diplomacy or war, but that is not our concern. Our purpose now should be to create three stable states capable of sustaining themselves during a period of transition and with a reasonable chance of surviving into the future.
The borders of the new Kurdistan should include the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, their adjacent oil fields, and a defensible buffer zone beyond. US forces should be deployed to secure this border and deter invention by Turkey, Iran, or Syria.
In return for the acquisition of disputed territory and resources, the Kurds should agree to pay a substantial, gradually declining, portion of their oil revenues to a stable Sunni state, so long as it maintains peaceful relations with Kurdistan. In return for a US guarantee of sovereignty, the Kurds should be placed on notice that the US reserves the right to withdraw its protection should they sponsor Kurdish separatism in Turkey – or, without our blessing, in Iran or Syria.
The borders of the Sunni state should include majority Sunni areas, including West Baghdad – but excluding the volatile Anbar province. US troops – joined or succeeded, if it can be arranged – by troops from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other friendly Muslim states – should occupy Anbar in force for a period of five years in order to round up Al Qaeda cells and give the Sunni state time to establish itself. Thereafter, if pacified, Anbar could be permitted to join the Sunni state.
The Shi’ite state would include the remainder of Mesopotamia, excluding East Baghdad. East Baghdad – the political base of Muktada al Sadr – would, like Anbar, be heavily occupied by US troops while the new state got on its feet under other leadership. In this case, US occupation would end as soon as the Shi’ite state was prepared to assume control.
Finally, while the US should negotiate for long-term bases in Kurdistan, all US and coalition forces, should be withdrawn from the new Sunni and Shi’a states as soon as either is prepared to take responsibility for its own survival.
And that’s it.
This proposed solution is far from elegant -- but it would work, at least in the sense that it would end the present struggle of all against all by creating two mutually hostile states. Future conflict could thus be channeled and subsumed into a conflict of states – amenable to diplomatic, economic and military pressures by the international community.
There are other advantages. An independent Kurdistan would assure the United States of one strong, and militarily dependent, ally in Mesopotamia, while affording us the means of applying leverage against Syria and Iran through their Kurdish populations. Even at the price of strained relations with Turkey, Kurdistan would represent a net gain for US policy in the Middle East.
By creating a Sunni state without oil resources, the US would create the best possibility of a second emergent democracy in the former Iraq. I have long subscribed to Zakaria’s Law – the historical principle that democracy cannot flourish in a state which controls vast natural resources. The argument, as set forth in Fareed Zakaria’s The Future of Freedom, is that democratic institutions evolve from a state’s need for revenues, and its consequent negotiations with its productive classes to barter political and property rights in exchange for new taxes.
The new Sunni state might seem barren ground for a new democracy, but there is – or was, until the diaspora resulting from the present chaos – a substantial, educated professional class in the Sunni areas of Mesopotamia. Given a stable state with an infusion of regular, gradually declining, payments from Kurdistan, this Sunni state would have time to develop the productive commercial and industrial bases of a successful republic. In time, this might well lead to the emergence of democratic institutions.
I have less hope for the emergence of democracy in the new Shi’a state, which would be oil-rich and dominated by Islamic politicians. The best that can be said is that an Islamic Republic of Basra would be confined to one-half of the present territory of Iraq. There is, however, some reason for hope.
If, under our present policies, Iraq could somehow be held together, it would inevitably become dependent upon Iran. The Sunni minority would never accept a Shi’a-dominated government, and the resulting civil disorder would compel the Iraqi government – as US trioops withdrew – to look to Iran for support.
On the other hand, a majority Shi’a state, while likely to become a temporary client of Iran, would have less reason to remain so. Independently wealthy, and with less political instability to contend with, the new state would eventually assume its own sense of national identity. As an Arab state, it would gradually begin to perceive how its interests differed from those of its Persian neighbor.
The future I propose is far from ideal, but, as Lady Macbeth said, “What’s done cannot be undone.” Given the alternatives – a perpetual occupation or a withdrawal leaving chaos in its wake – the partition of Mesopotamia offers the best way out of a thoroughly bad situation.
But we must act quickly.
Monday, December 4, 2006
Solving the Mess in Mesopotamia, Part One
I’m not a soldier, intelligence expert, or diplomat, and the closest I’ve been to Baghdad is Venice, Italy.
Please understand that.
If you believe – as many do – that the only proper foundation for national leadership is real-world, hands-on experience, I’m not your guy.
On the other hand, I’m a lifelong student of History, which Machiavelli – that most tough-minded of political realists – identified as the essential study of leaders.
I’m also a student (and actor) of Shakespeare, himself the greatest of all students of human nature.
If nothing else, I have those two things – History and Shakespeare – in common with Mr. Lincoln, who did a fair job of leading the nation despite a complete lack of previous executive experience or foreign travel and a military career limited to a few months as captain of volunteers in the Black Hawk War, during which his only combat was with mosquitos. (Lincoln’s witticism, not mine.)
I offer this rather lengthy disclaimer because, in Part II of this posting, I propose to set forth the course of action I would adopt Iraq if I woke up tomorrow and discovered that I was President of the United States.
For the fact is that, were I President, I would act along lines entirely at odds with anything suggested by President Bush, most of those running to replace him, the great majority of Republicans and Democrats in Congress, or the distinguished elder statesmen of the Iraq Study Group.
For all their vast and diverse experience – none of these hard-headed, real-world leaders seems to have the vaguest idea how to extract the US from Iraq without leaving behind a power vacuum which would invite intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey – and probably Israel – as well as a safe haven for Al Qaeda in Anbar province.
Which is not to say that our political leaders are incapable of devising a way forward. Success in Iraq simply isn’t their highest priority. The simple fact is that – since the midterms – few of our leaders nearly as concerned with the ultimate fate of Iraq as they are eager to catch up with public opinion.
And public opinion is, once again, headed over a cliff.
Having been duped into supporting an unnecessary and ill-considered invasion of Iraq, the American people have finally exercised the democratic equivalent of the “lemon law”. On November 7, they voted to return this lemon of a war to the folks who sold it to them.
The people want their money back.
Sadly, a war is not a used car. The harm done – to thousands of American troops; tens of thousands of Iraqis; and America’s armed forces, national debt, and credibility as a world leader – cannot be undone. The brutal regime which held together the centrifugal religious and tribal communities collectively called “Iraq” has been dismantled – replaced by a comic-opera parliamentary regime with absolutely no roots in the history and culture of Iraq.
And the fault is ours.
Mr. Bush may have led us into this war, but the great majority of Americans were credulous enough – and ignorant enough – to follow him. All but a handful of our political leaders lacked the good sense or moral fiber to try to slow him down. And those of us who knew better were too intimidated, or too fatalistic, to make much noise at the time.
We all have blood on our hands.
Nonetheless, the American people seem prepared to wash their hands of the whole business, and those who profess to speak for them are now demanding a pullout that will only compound the follies of 2002 and 2003..
But vox populi, vox whatever... If the people demand withdrawal, that’s what they’ll get, and the discussion of our options – from now on – will have more to do with affixing blame and saving face than with the future of Iraq.
Indeed, the dozens of options now under discussion seem to boil down to “cut and run” or “cut and stroll”. With the exception of Senator John McCain, no one is seriously talking about sticking around until Iraq is sufficiently pacified and well-governed to have some chance of surviving.
The Bush Administration seems to have decided on setting “benchmarks” for the Iraqi government – with the obvious intention of blaming the Iraqis when they fail to “take responsibility”. Of course, the Iraqi government has no chance of imposing order – and about the same prospects of surviving an American pullout as the former government of South Vietnam. But as long as the President can blame the Iraqis, he can bring the troops home and start planning for his presidential library.
Congressional Democrats seem content to cling to their pre-election strategy. They’re perfectly willing to place the blame on the Administration, so long as no one asks them for a constructive suggestion.
Most of the presidential wannabes – regardless of party – seem primarily concerned that America’s involvement be ended before November, 2008 – or at least January 20, 2009.
The most interesting approach is that expected from the Iraq Study Group, headed by Bush family consigliere* James Baker. The Group’s main suggestion will apparently be to begin a gradual withdrawal of combat units while inviting neighboring countries – particularly Iran and Syria – to help with the pacification of Iraq.
In realistic terms, this is nonsense. Given the hostility of both regimes to American interests, they can scarcely be expected to make things easier on us. Their interest is to reduce Iraq to a puppet state, and steps in that direction would almost certainly spark counter-intervention by the Saudis, probably the Turks – and, inevitably, the Israelis.
The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations offer an unpleasant future for Iraq – and long-term problems for the US. Indeed, these recommendations are make sense only when seen in terms of Mr. Baker’s loyalty to the Bush family – i.e., as an attempt to shift blame for Iraq’s destiny onto a pair of unpopular states – thus beginning the process of salvaging the historical “legacy” of Bush the Younger.
In short, nothing now being discussed in Washington makes sense in terms of America’s national interests. If we, the people, insist upon getting out of Iraq at any price – and allow our politicians to consult their own interests in doing so – we will be buying temporary relief at the price of future disasters which will make the present war seem like a mere unpleasantness.
Which is why, were I President, I would disregard the voices of nearly everyone in Washington and act decisively – even ruthlessly – to foster America’s national interests.
And I’d start with a change of vocabulary: I’d stop talking about Iraq, and start talking about Mesopotamia.
-30-
Note: I'd written this piece before reading Paul Krugman’s column of this date, but I give him credit for being the first I’ve seen to refer to Mr. Baker as the “Bush family consigliere”. At any rate, if I was ripping anyone off, it was Aaron Sorkin, for Leo McGarry’s line, “I’m a wartime consigliere.”
Please understand that.
If you believe – as many do – that the only proper foundation for national leadership is real-world, hands-on experience, I’m not your guy.
On the other hand, I’m a lifelong student of History, which Machiavelli – that most tough-minded of political realists – identified as the essential study of leaders.
I’m also a student (and actor) of Shakespeare, himself the greatest of all students of human nature.
If nothing else, I have those two things – History and Shakespeare – in common with Mr. Lincoln, who did a fair job of leading the nation despite a complete lack of previous executive experience or foreign travel and a military career limited to a few months as captain of volunteers in the Black Hawk War, during which his only combat was with mosquitos. (Lincoln’s witticism, not mine.)
I offer this rather lengthy disclaimer because, in Part II of this posting, I propose to set forth the course of action I would adopt Iraq if I woke up tomorrow and discovered that I was President of the United States.
For the fact is that, were I President, I would act along lines entirely at odds with anything suggested by President Bush, most of those running to replace him, the great majority of Republicans and Democrats in Congress, or the distinguished elder statesmen of the Iraq Study Group.
For all their vast and diverse experience – none of these hard-headed, real-world leaders seems to have the vaguest idea how to extract the US from Iraq without leaving behind a power vacuum which would invite intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey – and probably Israel – as well as a safe haven for Al Qaeda in Anbar province.
Which is not to say that our political leaders are incapable of devising a way forward. Success in Iraq simply isn’t their highest priority. The simple fact is that – since the midterms – few of our leaders nearly as concerned with the ultimate fate of Iraq as they are eager to catch up with public opinion.
And public opinion is, once again, headed over a cliff.
Having been duped into supporting an unnecessary and ill-considered invasion of Iraq, the American people have finally exercised the democratic equivalent of the “lemon law”. On November 7, they voted to return this lemon of a war to the folks who sold it to them.
The people want their money back.
Sadly, a war is not a used car. The harm done – to thousands of American troops; tens of thousands of Iraqis; and America’s armed forces, national debt, and credibility as a world leader – cannot be undone. The brutal regime which held together the centrifugal religious and tribal communities collectively called “Iraq” has been dismantled – replaced by a comic-opera parliamentary regime with absolutely no roots in the history and culture of Iraq.
And the fault is ours.
Mr. Bush may have led us into this war, but the great majority of Americans were credulous enough – and ignorant enough – to follow him. All but a handful of our political leaders lacked the good sense or moral fiber to try to slow him down. And those of us who knew better were too intimidated, or too fatalistic, to make much noise at the time.
We all have blood on our hands.
Nonetheless, the American people seem prepared to wash their hands of the whole business, and those who profess to speak for them are now demanding a pullout that will only compound the follies of 2002 and 2003..
But vox populi, vox whatever... If the people demand withdrawal, that’s what they’ll get, and the discussion of our options – from now on – will have more to do with affixing blame and saving face than with the future of Iraq.
Indeed, the dozens of options now under discussion seem to boil down to “cut and run” or “cut and stroll”. With the exception of Senator John McCain, no one is seriously talking about sticking around until Iraq is sufficiently pacified and well-governed to have some chance of surviving.
The Bush Administration seems to have decided on setting “benchmarks” for the Iraqi government – with the obvious intention of blaming the Iraqis when they fail to “take responsibility”. Of course, the Iraqi government has no chance of imposing order – and about the same prospects of surviving an American pullout as the former government of South Vietnam. But as long as the President can blame the Iraqis, he can bring the troops home and start planning for his presidential library.
Congressional Democrats seem content to cling to their pre-election strategy. They’re perfectly willing to place the blame on the Administration, so long as no one asks them for a constructive suggestion.
Most of the presidential wannabes – regardless of party – seem primarily concerned that America’s involvement be ended before November, 2008 – or at least January 20, 2009.
The most interesting approach is that expected from the Iraq Study Group, headed by Bush family consigliere* James Baker. The Group’s main suggestion will apparently be to begin a gradual withdrawal of combat units while inviting neighboring countries – particularly Iran and Syria – to help with the pacification of Iraq.
In realistic terms, this is nonsense. Given the hostility of both regimes to American interests, they can scarcely be expected to make things easier on us. Their interest is to reduce Iraq to a puppet state, and steps in that direction would almost certainly spark counter-intervention by the Saudis, probably the Turks – and, inevitably, the Israelis.
The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations offer an unpleasant future for Iraq – and long-term problems for the US. Indeed, these recommendations are make sense only when seen in terms of Mr. Baker’s loyalty to the Bush family – i.e., as an attempt to shift blame for Iraq’s destiny onto a pair of unpopular states – thus beginning the process of salvaging the historical “legacy” of Bush the Younger.
In short, nothing now being discussed in Washington makes sense in terms of America’s national interests. If we, the people, insist upon getting out of Iraq at any price – and allow our politicians to consult their own interests in doing so – we will be buying temporary relief at the price of future disasters which will make the present war seem like a mere unpleasantness.
Which is why, were I President, I would disregard the voices of nearly everyone in Washington and act decisively – even ruthlessly – to foster America’s national interests.
And I’d start with a change of vocabulary: I’d stop talking about Iraq, and start talking about Mesopotamia.
-30-
Note: I'd written this piece before reading Paul Krugman’s column of this date, but I give him credit for being the first I’ve seen to refer to Mr. Baker as the “Bush family consigliere”. At any rate, if I was ripping anyone off, it was Aaron Sorkin, for Leo McGarry’s line, “I’m a wartime consigliere.”
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